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| 題 名 | 論維根斯坦的哲學方法=On Wittgenstein's Method of Philosophy |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 蔡信安; | 書刊名 | 國立臺灣大學哲學論評 |
| 卷 期 | 11 1988.01[民77.01] |
| 頁 次 | 頁143-157 |
| 專 輯 | 當代西方哲學與方法論研討會專號 |
| 分類號 | 147.79 |
| 關鍵詞 | 維根斯坦; 哲學概念; 哲學方法; 邏輯、哲學論文; 哲學探討; Ludwig Wittgenstein; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 英文摘要 | A method of philosophy is not independent from a conception of philosophy. The way of understanding Wittgenstein’s method of philosophy is in his Philosophical Investigations. He says, “The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness” (Sec. 255). And, “The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always know. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. ” (Sec. 109). That is to say, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is that philosophy is not a doctrine of reality, but a treatment of illness which is arised from human life. The treatment is out of his theories of language. This paper deals with his two different prescriptions in two books, i. e., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. The author contends that it is one method, that is, “by means of language”, and one aim, “die Loesung des Problems des Lebens. ” |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。