查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 審計客戶與審計人員策略選擇之分析性研究=An Analytical Study of Strategic Alternatives between Client and Auditor |
---|---|
作者姓名(中文) | 鍾紹熙; | 書刊名 | 美和技術學院學報 |
卷期 | 23:1 2004.04[民93.04] |
頁次 | 頁229-241 |
分類號 | 495.9 |
關鍵詞 | 審計人員; 分析性研究; 代理理論; 管理舞弊; 勾結; 賽局理論; Analytical study; Agency theory; Auditor; Managerial fraud; Collusion; Game theory; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本研究以皮理理論為基礎,將審計客戶分為股東與經理人,探討股東、經理人與審計人員三者間之代理問題。審計的功能之一為減少代理問題,但如果經理人與審計人員發生勾結則將產生額外的問題,本研究以賽局理論分析經理人與審計人員間之策略選擇與兩者間可能發生勾結的情境以及股東應如何減少勾結的發生等。研究結果顯示,經理人均會從事高估盈餘之不實報導,亦即管理舞弊;而在硬性資訊監督模式下,審計人員若未查核到經理人舞弊,則不論經理人是否努力或誠實,其只會執行正常審計,若股東審計人員擴大審計並出具城實之查該報告,就必須提供審計人員額外的激勵報酬,以降低審計人員與經理人勾結的誘因。 |
英文摘要 | Based on the agency theory, this study explores the agency problem among owners, mangers, and auditor. One function of auditing is to minimize agency problems. However, it will produce additional problems if collusion happens between the manger and auditor. This study applies game theory to analyze possible strategies chosen by both the manager and the auditor, and collusion through motivation by the owner. The study discovered that without punishment, irrespective of auditor's competence, non-hard-working managers tend to lie. And if the auditor is unaware of managerial fraud, under hard information supervision model, the optimal strategy is to execute the lowest audit effort. If the owner expects the auditor to report truthfully, the might offer additional incentives to reduce the possible collusion between the manager and the auditor. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。