查詢結果分析
相關文獻
- Judicial Ideal Points in New Democracies: The Case of Taiwan
- 司法院大法官審理案件法的沿革與修正
- 司法院大法官「法律違憲解釋」之研究--以第五屆、第六屆大法官為中心
- 我國司法院大法官選任制度的幾個問題--從違憲審查之「反多數決」法理觀察
- 司法違憲審查的制度選擇與司法院定位
- 論法官聲請釋憲
- 司法院大法官違憲審查標的之研究--以第一屆至第六屆大法官為中心
- 司法院大法官違憲審查標的之研究--以第一屆至第六屆大法官為中心
- 試論大法官繼受外國法之特色與挑戰:影響繼受結果「質」的幾個關鍵
- Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Case of Taiwan
頁籤選單縮合
題名 | Judicial Ideal Points in New Democracies: The Case of Taiwan=新興民主的司法理想點--以臺灣為例 |
---|---|
作者 | 林靜萍; Pellegrina, Lucia Dalla; Garoupa, Nuno; Lin, Shirley Ching-ping; |
期刊 | National Taiwan University Law Review |
出版日期 | 20120300 |
卷期 | 7:1 2012.03[民101.03] |
頁次 | 頁123-165 |
分類號 | 589.92 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | 大法官; 司法院; 理想點; 臺灣; 實證分析; 違憲審查; 憲法法院; Constitutional court; Constitutional review; Empirical analysis; Grand justice; Ideal point; Judicial yuan; Taiwan; |
中文摘要 | 本文以1998年至2009年任職臺灣司法院的大法官為研究對象,估計其理想點,以實證分析方法研究影響其司法行為的決定因素。又, 臺灣違憲審查制度的建立與發展,與該國由一黨專政的威權體制轉型為新興民主政體息息相關,故其在個案研究上更具價值。根據本文研 究結果,亦即估計出來的理想點顯示,首先,無法證明總統與其提名、任用之大法官具有政治結盟的關係。其次,除少數例外,絕大多數大法官的理想點均分佈在中庸地帶。最後,對於作者群先前運用計量經濟分析,否定態度性假設的研究成果,本文也再度確認司法院大法官並不傾向響應其提名人的政黨利益。 |
英文摘要 | ABSTRACT This paper extends the empirical analysis of the determinants of judicial behavior by estimating the ideal points for the Justices of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court from 1988-2009. Taiwan presents a particularly interesting case because the establishment and development of constitutional review corresponds to the country’s political transition from an authoritarian regime to an emerging democracy. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political coalitions in the Judicial Yuan based on presidential appointments. We did not find any strong evidence of such coalitions. Our empirical results indicated that, with the exception of a handful of Justices, most of them have moderate estimated ideal points. In the context of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, our results also confirm the previous econometric analysis that largely rejected the attitudinal hypothesis, which predicted that Justices would respond to their appointers’ party interests. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。