頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 政府出資比例對民間興建纜車意願之賽局分析=The Effects of the Equity Share of the Public Sector on the Private Sector's Participation in Cabal Cars Construction: A Game Theory Approach |
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作 者 | 王淑美; 謝承憲; | 書刊名 | 傳播與發展學報 |
卷期 | 33 2016.07[民105.07] |
頁次 | 頁157-172 |
分類號 | 992.3 |
關鍵詞 | 子賽局完全耐許均衡; 最適出資比率; Hotelling模型; 賽局理論; 纜車; Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; Optimal investment ratio; Hotelling model; Game theory; Cable cars; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
DOI引用網址 | 10.6544/JCD.2016.33.6 |
中文摘要 | 纜車已成為世界各國發展觀光的重要方式。纜車除了可以節省旅遊時間,降低其他交通工具對於環境的衝擊;通常藉由搭乘纜車亦可享受風景,具有觀光的效益。不過纜車的興建亦需較高的成本投入,所以政府通常須負責興建,或是藉由出資的方式吸引民間參與。本文則嘗試利用賽局理論,利用Hotelling之模型,並納入時間因素及舒適度之因素,研析政府與纜車業者之互動行為。結果顯示觀光效益愈低,營運成本愈高,政府之出資比例亦愈高。而纜車業者之票價亦隨著營運成本而上升。另外若纜車對於環境衝擊影響過大時,政府則傾向向纜車業者收費。 |
英文摘要 | Cable cars have become an important aspect of tourism development in many countries around the world. Cable cars reduce travel time, and help to alleviate the impact other methods of transportation have on the environment. Most cable cars provide visitors with access to scenic views and are therefore highly beneficial to the tourism industry. Nevertheless, the construction of cable cars requires high capital investment, which is why cable cars construction is often conducted by, or commissioned and funded by, government authorities. In this paper, the author utilizes game theory and Hotelling's model combined with factors of time and comfort level to analyze the behavior of government authorities and cable cars operators. The analysis shows that the fewer tourism attributes cable cars may be ascribed with, the higher its cost of operation and ratio of public funding. This means ticket prices set by operators will also be comparatively high. In the event a cable cars causes excessive environmental impact, government authorities tend to impart additional tariffs on cable cars operators. |
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