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題 名 | 政黨提名策略與派系輪政之競局理論分析=Party Nomination Strategy and Faction Alternation in Taiwan's Local Politics--A Game Theoretic Analysis |
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作 者 | 姚惠忠; | 書刊名 | 人文及社會科學集刊 |
卷 期 | 10:3 1998.09[民87.09] |
頁 次 | 頁451-475 |
分類號 | 573.3 |
關鍵詞 | 競局理論; 信號競局; 選舉; 政黨提名; 地方派系; 派系輪政; 賽局理論; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文以競局理論模型,透過連續均衡概念,發現唯有當決策者提供資源的成本位 於適當區間的情況下,決策者的策略性表態,才具有完全的訊號作用。而且,當國民黨提名 導致派系雙雙投入選戰之機率,大於國民黨開放導致派系雙雙投入選戰之機率時,國民黨反 而會採提名的策略。顯示派系皆投入選戰,並非國民黨所不樂見的局面。因此,派系輪政只 是國民黨維持兩派系均衡工具而已。當排戰慣例之派系力量越大,國民黨越可能扶持「應該 輪到執政」的派系,而當挑戰慣例之派系力量不大時,國民黨反而會以開放之策略,讓「應 該輪到執政」的派系倍感威脅。 |
英文摘要 | In this manuscript, the author models the recent history of relations between the ruling Kuomintang (KMT, or the Nationalist Party) and its local factions an an example of a "three-persons, sequential, incomplete information game". By utilizing the solution concept of "sequential equilibrium" it is demonstrated that the KMT is constrained in the use of "signaling" as its strategy to dominate factions in local politics. However, strategic signaling can be most powerful when the "election cost" to the KMT is perceived to be within a certain range. In this case, the KMT has its best opportunity to manipulate local factions such that the KMT's political dominance can be preserved through the wellknown phenomenon of "faction alternation" in Taiwan's local politics. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。