頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 候選人賄選動機之分析=An Analysis of the Candidate Incentives to Vote-Buying |
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作 者 | 吳重禮; 嚴淑芬; | 書刊名 | 理論與政策 |
卷 期 | 14:1=53 2000.03[民89.03] |
頁 次 | 頁1-21 |
分類號 | 573.397 |
關鍵詞 | 賄選; 選舉; 候選人; 賽局理論; Vote-buying; Election; Candidate; Game theory; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 賄選風氣猖獗是我國選舉政治的一大弊端,早已成為社士會各界廣泛批判的議題。本文以候選人賄選動機為研究焦點,旨在瞭解臺灣地區賄選成風的原因。就候選人策略選擇的面向看來,在選舉過程中,候選人必然盡其所能爭取選票,並評估其他對手的競選策略而擬定自身的策略,因此本文以參選者之間的預期互動關係為切入點,解釋候選人為何採取賄選手段。據此,本文運用「資訊不充分賽局理論」(insufficient information game theory)為分析模型,考量影響候選人賄選動機的若干因素,推論數項基本命題。經由檢證相關命題,本文以為,候選人的賄選動機正是成本效益考量下,利之所趨的理性計算行為,而這亦是造成我國賄選猖獗無法杜絕的主因。 |
英文摘要 | Vote-buying in elections is widespread in Taiwan's electoral politics. In order to understand the causes of prevailing practice of vote-buying, this study concentrates on the candidate's incentives to buy votes. From the perspective of strategy selection, candidates try their best to maximize the votes in the electoral process, and decide their own tactics via evaluating and calculating their opponents' strategies. This research therefore regards the predictive payoff inter-actions between contenders as the point at which to illustrate the candidate's behavior of vote-buying. Accordingly, we employ the framework of Fr insufficient information game theory" in which a variety of determinants of vote-buying are considered to reach some corollaries. By analyzing these corollaries, we conclude that the vote-buying is a form of candidate's rational behavior, and that is the reason the phenomenon of vote-buying remains. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。