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題名 | 萊特的判斷依決理論對自我知識之解釋=Wright's Judgment-Dependence Account of Self-Knowledge |
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作者姓名(中文) | 鄭凱元; | 書刊名 | 東吳哲學學報 |
卷期 | 13 民95.02 |
頁次 | 頁35-66 |
分類號 | 144.8 |
關鍵詞 | 自我知識; 判斷依決理論; 認知式與非認知式解釋; 第一人稱權威; Self-knowledge; Judgment-dependence; Cognitivist v.s. non-cognitivist account; First-person authority; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 關於自我知識的哲學難題是,如何去解釋一個人似乎以一種直接而權威的方式來認識其自身之內在心理狀態。近年來萊特提出所謂的「判斷依決理論」來解決此哲學難題。根據萊特的說法,心理狀態在本質上是次性,其性質之構成由其擁有者於適當條件下所形成之判斷來決,因而人可以接接而權威之方式掌握其心理狀態。有鑑於萊特理論的影響力與新意,本文主要有二:一、闡明萊特理論的內涵,指出其與傳統兩個主要認知式與非認知式進路之異同處;二、探討萊特理論所隱含的一些可能缺失,髼為進一步思考此一議題之依據。 |
英文摘要 | A main problem about self-knowledge is concerned with how we explain the special epistemic features of our mental states, i.e., we seem to know our own mental states in a direct and authoritative manner. In recent years, Crispin Wright has offered a so-called “judgment-dependence account” to explain self-knowledge. According to this theory, a mental state is metaphysically construed as secondary property, whose constitution is determined by the judgment of its possessor made under cognitively ideal conditions. A person thus comes to know his own mental states directly and authoritatively. This paper attempts to achieve two goals: 1) Illuminate the main idea of Wright’s judgment-dependence account, by contrasting this account with two main traditional approaches-cognitivist and non-cognitivist; 2) Examine Wright’s account, by pointing out that it may inhere some defects that make us doubt whether this account is fully satisfactory as a theory of self-knowledge. |
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