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題 名 | 詮釋的不確定說和自我知識=The Indeterminacy of Interpretation and Self-knowledge |
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作 者 | 林從一; | 書刊名 | 國立臺灣大學哲學論評 |
卷 期 | 24 2001.01[民90.01] |
頁 次 | 頁219-275+277-278 |
分類號 | 144.8 |
關鍵詞 | 不確定說; 第一人稱; 自我知識; 語言的客觀性; 三角測量隱喻; The indeterminacy thesis; First-person; Self-knowledge; Objectivity of language; Triangulation metaphor; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 蒯因和戴維森的不確定說主張,單一指涉和確定意義不是語意事實,它們是虛假的概念。這個主張具有普遍性,並且擴及意向性狀態:單一指涉和確定意義不僅不是他人語言的語意特徵,它們也不是我們母語或第一人稱語言的語意特徵;同樣的宣稱,也適用於任何具有確定內容的意向性狀態。在這個觀點下,既然,單一指涉、確定意義和確定心靈內容,不是任何語言和心靈的特徵,它們就不是任何人,包括行動者本身,的知識對象--我們不能知道我們自己的[確定的]字詞的指涉、語句的意義和心靈的內容到底是什麼,因為它們根本不存在。然而,另外一方面,戴維森也主張,我們通常具有我們自己語言的語意知識。這兩個主張之間,至少表面上看起來,存在著緊張關係。邁爾巴斯在其「達納戴維森和意義之鏡」(Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning)一書中,曾試圖替戴維森消解這個表面上的緊張。但是,本文將指出邁爾巴斯為戴維森所作的回應,並沒有忠於戴維森對自我知識的基本看法。本文將以一種不同於邁爾巴斯的角度,呈現出戴維森的不確定說和其對自我知識的看法之間,不存在真正的不一致。本文認為,對戴維森而言,[我們通常具有我們自己言談的內容之知識]中的「知識」一詞指的是,對如何正確地使用字詞的知識,而不是關於什麼是字詞的對象的知識。知道如何使用字詞,是一種實踐的能力,具有這種能力並不預設字詞有單一的指涉,亦不預設語句有確定意義。 |
英文摘要 | Quine and Davidson advocate the thesis that assignment of semantic contents and intentional states is underdetermined by the totality of behavioral evidence. More specifically, given all the empirical data, the decision as to how to attribute semantic and intentional content s arbitrary. Given the indeterminacy thesis and Davidson's contention that semantic and intentional content are, in principle, publicly accessible, it follows that there is no such things as unique reference, determinate meaning and definite mental content. Furthermore, since such things are not factual matters in anyone's language and mind, they are not objects for anyone, including the agent himself, to know of. However, Davidson also endorses the view that even though we sometimes are not certain about what other speakers believe and mean, we are nonetheless usually certain about what we ourselves believe and mean. This view seems to be at a conflict with the thesis of indeterminacy as it applied to the first person case. It has been argued, most pointedly by Malpas, that in Davidson's account there is no incompatibility between the indeterminacy in the first person case and the intuition that we usually have knowledge of our the content of own utterances and intentional states. In this paper, I mainly argue for two points:first, Malpas' reconciliation for Davidson is based on a seriously misunderstanding of some of Davidson's own ideas and is therefore fore inadequate; second, so long as we distinguish two kinds of knowledge involved in the seemingly conflict propositions, the conflict will be proved to be merely apparent. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。