頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 日本金融體系的政治經濟分析=The Political Economy of the Japanese Financial System |
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作 者 | 何思因; | 書刊名 | 問題與研究 |
卷 期 | 38:9 1999.09[民88.09] |
頁 次 | 頁31-44 |
分類號 | 562.1931 |
關鍵詞 | 主要銀行體系; 大藏省; 道德危機; 代理機構問題; Main bank system; Moral hazard; Agency problem; Ministry of finance; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 一九九七年年中開始的亞洲金融風暴,打破了亞洲經濟奇蹟的神話。至今檢討起 來,這個金融風暴不僅是貨幣危機、也是金融制度的危機。日本雖未名列這波金融風暴直接 受害的國家,但是其金融體系顯示出的問題,對總體經濟的拖累,和其他受害國家比較起來 ,有許多類似之處。因此檢討日本金融體系的運作,很可能讓我們對東亞其他地區金融制度 運作做進一步的管窺。本文即就日本金融體系的形成、運作、其政治環境做一探討,並加以 分析。質言之,日本金融體系的運作,政治和經濟結為一體,因此「道德危險」和「代理機 構問題」極多。要袪除這些弊病,需將政治決定和金融運作分開,日本才可能有健全的金融 制度。 |
英文摘要 | With the benefit of hindsight, analysts now know that the Asian financial turmoil that began in mid-1997 was not only a currency crisis but also a financial institutional crisis. Although Japan was left relatively unscathed by the crisis, its decade-old economic stagnation still continued to demonstrate an institutional malaise that is not uncommon among other financial crisisridden Asian countries. A probe into the political economy of the Japanese banking sector could shed light upon the workings of the political economy in other Asian countries. This paper is an attempt to analyze the formation, operation, and political environment of the Japanese banking sector. It argues, in short, that "moral hazard" and the "agency problem" are deeply imbedded in the institutional arrangement of the Japanese banking system. Only by reducing the political involvement in the market can Japan strengthen its financial institutions. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。