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題名 | 中央銀行的穩定政策與不完全訊息= |
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作者 | 林正寶; |
期刊 | 國立中興大學臺中夜間部學報 |
出版日期 | 19951100 |
卷期 | 1 1995.11[民84.11] |
頁次 | 頁249-263 |
分類號 | 562.421 |
語文 | chi |
關鍵詞 | 穩定政策; 不完全訊息; 理性預期; Stabilization policy; Incomplete information; Rational expectations; |
中文摘要 | 本文利用遊戲理論的技巧分析在理性預期假說下,若社會大眾具有完全訊息,則 中央銀行的最適穩定政策是採用固定法則,而非權衡性的政策;若社會大眾擁有的訊息不完 全,中央銀行可以採取權衡性政策企圖欺騙社會大眾,使其達到增加產出並降低失業之目的 。本文也同時發現,若觀察期間予以延長,或社會大眾的時間偏好轉強,中央銀行採用權衡 性貨幣政策並配合欺騙手段,以達到穩定政策目的之可能性將會減少。 |
英文摘要 | This paper analyzes that under the rational expectations hypothesis the optimal stabilization policy of central bank should be the fixed policy rule rather than the discretional policy if the public have complete information by utilizing the technique of game theory. However, if the public have incomplete information, the central bank may execute the discretional policy along with cheating in order to attain the objectives of the increase in real output and the decrease in unemployment level. In addition, this study indicates that if the time horizon is infinite, or if the public have stronger preference of time as to the value of loss, the central bank would have less chances in the attainment of the objectives of stabilization policy if she uses the discretionary monetary policy with a cheat. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。