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| 題 名 | 當事人視角下的陶德曼調停=Oskar Trautmann's Perspective on the Trautmann Mediation |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 張哲維; | 書刊名 | 新史學 |
| 卷 期 | 36:2 2025.06[民114.06] |
| 頁 次 | 頁145-200 |
| 分類號 | 628.5 |
| 關鍵詞 | 陶德曼調停; 德國對華政策; 中日戰爭; 蔣中正的議和底線; 滿洲國問題; Trautmann mediation; Germany's China policy; Second Sino-Japanese war; Chiang Kai-shek's terms for peace; The Manchukuo question; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 本文從陶德曼當事人的視角,重新論述中日戰爭初期由德國擔任中介 者傳達日本和談條件給中國的外交活動。德國發動陶德曼調停的內在 動機可從希特勒的主觀意願、各方勢力的不同考量和陶德曼的道德使 命感三方面探討。事實上,陶德曼曾先後三次親自轉交日本和平條件 給蔣中正,分別發生在 1937 年 11 月 5 日和 12 月 2 日,以及 12 月 26 日因蔣生病臨時由孔祥熙轉呈。第一次調停發生在日本陷入淞滬戰場 的泥淖之中與迫於布魯塞爾會議的國際壓力,主動提出和緩的和平條 件 ――即沒有要求中國承認滿洲國,但因蔣堅持「國際化政略」而拒 絕。第二次調停是在上海淪陷後,日本內部對於是否進攻南京出現分 歧時,因外相廣田弘毅向德國傳達原有的和平條件不變而發生。這讓 納粹卐字旗一度象徵著和平,飄揚在長江江面上。然而,由於日本主 戰派抬頭、德國暫緩承認滿洲國和陶德曼駐地轉移而錯失時機,最終 導致和平破滅。第三次調停則已然成為了日本的逼降行動,讓德國面 臨騎虎難下的尷尬局面。從當事人陶德曼的視角出發,清楚地顯示出 陶德曼調停是在德國建議下,由日本主動提出而促成的,也因日本陷 於「勝者迷思」而失敗。德國政府始終扮演中立調停者的角色,並沒 有偏頗某一方。反倒是陶德曼本人展現出親華反日的立場,而這是過 去以國家為主體論述的陶德曼調停沒有呈現出來的一面。 |
| 英文摘要 | The “Trautmann Mediation” refers to Germany’s diplomatic effort at the outset of the Sino-Japanese War, during which it acted as a neutral intermediary to convey Japan’s peace terms to China. The underlying motivations behind this initiative can be traced to the subjective interests of Adolf Hitler, internal political dynamics within Germany, and the moral convictions of the mediator, Oskar Trautmann. Trautmann personally conveyed the terms of the Japanese peace talks to Chiang Kai-Shek on three occasions: November 5, December 2 and December 26, 1937 (submitted to the Finance Minister Kung Hsiang-hsi due to Chiang’s illness). The first mediation occurred during the context of the Battle of Shanghai and against the backdrop of the Nine Power Treaty Conference. It compelled Japan to offer relatively moderate terms—notably, without demanding China to recognize Manchukuo—yet failed due to Chiang’s adherence to an “internationalization” strategy aimed at mobilizing global opinion. The second mediation took place after the fall of Shanghai. Japan was divided over whether to attack Nanking, and Foreign Minister Hirota Koki communicated to Germany that the terms of the peace talks would remain unchanged. Hopes for peace were eventually dashed due to the rise of Japan’s pro-war faction, Germany’s temporary delay in recognizing Manchukuo, and a missed opportunity caused by the relocation of the German Embassy. By the third mediation, Japan had shifted to demanding unconditional surrender, reducing the effort to a unilateral campaign and placing Germany in a diplomatically awkward position. From Trautmann’s perspective, the mediation had originated with Japan, prompted by a Germany suggestion, and failed primarily because Japan was caught up in an “illusion” prompted by military victory. Throughout the process, the German government maintained a posture of official neutrality, though Trautmann personally exhibited clear sympathies towards China and a critical stance towards Japanese aggression. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。