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題名 | 產業外產品創新授權及福利分析=Quality Competition, Outsider Patentee Licensing, and Welfare |
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作者 | 郭平欣; 曹古駒; 邱靖珈; 林燕淑; | 書刊名 | 經濟論文叢刊 |
卷期 | 46:4 2018.12[民107.12] |
頁次 | 頁619-644 |
分類號 | 555.9 |
關鍵詞 | 業外授權; 產品品質創新; 垂直差異; 社會福利; Outsider patentee; Vertical differentiation; Licensing; Negotiation; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文利用循序談判賽局探討在品質異質的雙占價格競爭中,業外品質技術擁有者的授權行為。本文得到:(1)如果新技術屬於利潤極大化的業外廠商,則當授權前的品質競爭不激烈,新技術授權給高品質廠商並收取策略授權金;當授權前的品質競爭激烈,但是新技術提高品質有限,以傳統授權金移轉技術給高品質廠商;當授權前的品質競爭激烈,但是新技術可以大幅提升品質,以傳統授權金移轉技術給低品質廠商為最有利。(2)如果新技術屬於政府,政府會希望將新技術移轉給低品質廠商;當新技術與高品質差異不大時,需補貼低品質廠商使用新技術。 |
英文摘要 | We analyze the optimal licensing strategy of an outside patent holder of a superior quality technology for a Bertrand duopoly with different product quality in a finite stage sequential bargaining game. Two types of fixed-fees are considered, a strategic one and the conventional one. If the new technology is owned by a revenue maximizing outsider, it is shown that the optimal licensing strategy is transferring the patent (1) to the original high quality firm with a strategic fixed fee when the quality difference between the duopoly is large enough, (2) to the original high quality firm with a conventional fixed fee when the quality difference is small and the new technology helps little, and (3) to the original low quality firm with a conventional fixed fee, otherwise. If the new technology is owned by a social welfare maximizing government agency, it is shown that transferring technology to the low quality firm is optimal and a subsidy is required in case the new quality is improved very little. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。