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題 名 | 哈特法律實證主義理論的哲學基礎批判=A Philosophical Critique of H. L. A. Hart's Legal Positivism |
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作 者 | 張延祥; | 書刊名 | 東海大學法學研究 |
卷 期 | 48 2016.04[民105.04] |
頁 次 | 頁215-260 |
分類號 | 580.1 |
關鍵詞 | 法律實證主義; 實證主義; 認識論; 自然主義謬誤; 是-應當命題; Legal positivism; Positivism; Epistemology; Naturalistic fallacy; Is-ought; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 哈特的法律實證主義必須從認識論這一根本立場上來理解與界定,其核心是事實與價值分離的學說。分離學說來源於G.E.摩爾界定自然主義謬誤所依據的認知與情感是分離的原理。然而G.E.摩爾的分離論乃是對休謨的「是-應當」區分學說的誤解。休謨並未將認知與情感分離開,相反,他認為理性受情感支配,並服務和服從情感。哈特的法理學所主張的道德中立在認識論上是不成立的,其理論總體上具有內在的根本衝突,是一個品格分裂的法理學。哈特的法理學失敗的根本原因在於哈特對現代實證主義是盲從的,其所盲從的現代實證主義乃是將人之情感從經驗中盲目切割掉的閹割的實證主義。 |
英文摘要 | With the separation thesis of fact and value as its core, H.L.A. Hart's legal positivism must be understood and defined in the fundamental sense of epistemology. The separation thesis was derived from G.E. Moore's doctrine of naturalistic fallacy, that is the separation of cognition and emotion. G.E. Moore's separation came from a misunderstanding of Hume’s thesis of is-ought. Hume distinguished reason and emotion, but not separated cognition and emotion, for he strongly held that reason was subservient to passion. H.L.A. Hart's legal theory is a dissociative disordered one, for it's claim of moral neutrality cannot be qualified in epistemology, thus contributing to the fundamental internal contradictions in his legal theory. The failure of H.L.A. Hart's legal theory consists in his blind acceptance of modern positivism, which is a mutilated version compared with classical positivism, cutting away passion from experience. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。