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| 題 名 | 作業系統、內建應用軟體之廠商競爭與福利分析=The Competition and Welfare Analysis for Operation Systems and Built-in Application Software |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 劉惠玲; | 書刊名 | 東吳經濟商學學報 |
| 卷 期 | 71 2010.12[民99.12] |
| 頁 次 | 頁89-112 |
| 專 輯 | 產業經濟專輯 |
| 分類號 | 555.13 |
| 關鍵詞 | 作業系統; 應用軟體; 寡占競爭; Operation system; Application software; Oligopolistic competition; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 微軟公司於視窗作業系統中搭載IE(Internet Explorer),文獻上通常以市場力量來切入這個問題,認為微軟利用作業平台的獨占優勢,在瀏覽器市場與其主要競爭對手Netscape從事不公平的競爭。但這個問題在加入廠商策略性內建應用軟體數目考量之後,呈現全然不同的面貌。本文研究獨占與雙占廠商的最適內建應用軟體數以及市場結構轉變對社會福利的影響。本文發現在Bertrand價格競爭之下,既存廠商的最適內建軟體數在獨占時有可能較多,雙占下兩廠商的最適內建軟體數有可能低於獨占下的社會最適軟體數。雙占的社會福利較獨占時高。當市場成為雙占Cournot數量競爭時,若消費者對既存廠商內建應用軟體的偏好程度較低,則雙占市場的社會福利會降低。當消費者對既存廠商的偏好程度較低時,Cournot數量競爭下廠商內建應用軟體的數目較Bertrand價格競爭下多;反之,當消費者對既存廠商的偏好程度較高時,Bertrand價格競爭下廠商內建應用軟體的數目則較多。 |
| 英文摘要 | Microsoft integrated Internet Explorer (IE) web browser into Windows operation system as a built-in application software. In the literatures, the economists usually take the viewpoint that Microsoft abuse his monopoly power in the market of personal computer operation systems and engage in unfair competition with Netscape, his major rival, in the internet browser software market. However the scenarios have changed if the number of built-in application software in the operation systems was a strategic competition behavior. This paper studies the optimal number of built-in application software for monopoly and duopoly operation system market and the social welfare impact for market structure change. Under the Bertrand competition setup, it is possible that the optimal number for monopoly firm is larger than the incumbent firm of duopoly case. The social welfare of duopoly case is definitely larger than the monopoly case. Under the Counot competition setup, the social welfare of duopoly case would reduce when the consumers' preference degree is lower for built-in software of incumbent firm. Comparing the optimal number of built-in application software, quantity competition case is larger than price competition case while the consumers' preference degree is lower for built-in software of incumbent firm. On the contrary, the optimal number of Bertrand competition setup is larger than of Cournot competition setup at the case that the consumers' preference degree is higher for built-in software of incumbent firm. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。