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| 題 名 | 平等權審查標準的選擇問題：兼論比例原則在平等權審查上的適用可能=Choosing the Standards of Scrutiny for the Equality Right Cases: Questioning the Applicability of the Proportionality Principle |
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| 作 者 | 黃昭元; | 書刊名 | 國立臺灣大學法學論叢 |
| 卷 期 | 37:4 2008.12[民97.12] |
| 頁 次 | 頁253-284 |
| 分類號 | 581.231 |
| 關鍵詞 | 平等權; 審查標準; 比例原則; 分類標準; 類型化; 大法官解釋; Euality rght; Standards of scrutiny; Proportionality principle; Classifications; Categorization; J.Y. interpretations; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 本文以平等權的審查標準為討論範圍，並以我國大法官有關平等權的解釋為分析起點，從方法論上探討平等權審查標準的選擇問題，並且同時檢討比例原則能否適用或轉用到平等權的爭議。本文「貳」首先分析我國大法官有關平等權之解釋，並發現大法官原先常使用「差別待遇是否合理或必要」來審查平等權案件，但對於何謂合理或必要，則常未詳細論證。近兩、三年來之解釋則開始使用「分類標準」或「權利領域」作為選擇審查標準的依據，也似乎開始以類型化方式操作審查標準，值得注意。在「參」部分，本文進一步檢討國內之相關學說主張，並發現國內部分留德學者近年來也開始探討平等權之審查標準，且主張繼受德國之新舊公式，借用或套用比例原則為審查平等權的新公式。雖然上述主張也屬類型化的操作，但本文「肆」認為比例原則的審查對象在於手段所限制的「程度」或「量」，這與平等權的核心爭議往往在於「分類標準」的敏感度，顯然有別。即使將比例原則轉化，仍難以用於平等權案件之審查。本文在「伍」主張：平等權的審查標準應往類型化方向發展，並且應重視分類標準和權利領域這兩項因素，特別是分類標準。 |
| 英文摘要 | Beginning with analysis of the relevant J.Y. Interpretations, this article researches on how to choose the standards of scrutiny for equality right cases. Meanwhile, it also discusses the applicability of the proportionality principle to such cases. In Part II, this article finds the earlier J.Y. Interpretations often used the vague test of ”reasonable” or ”necessary” to measure whether the different treatment in question is arbitrary, without giving sufficient justifications. In the last several years, Grand Justices began to determine the standards of scrutiny by looking at the classifications and types of interests involved. An increasing use of categorization approach seems to emerge, too. In Part III, this article further finds many Germany-trained constitutional scholars argue in favor of the reception of the ”dual formula” developed in Germany, which applies the proportionality principle as the new and stricter formula for reviewing some of the equality right cases. However, in Part IV, this article argues the proportionality principle as applied in this ”dual formula,” in spite of being a categorization approach, would still put too much emphasis on the ”degree of restrictions” and fail to address the most sensitive issue of equality right: classifications. With or without modifications, the proportionality principle would not fit to be an appropriate standard of scrutiny for equality right cases. This article finally argues, in Part V, there should be multi-level standards of scrutiny for equality right cases and the categorization approach should be a better one to proceed. In so doing, the courts should take both classifications and types of interests more seriously in choosing the appropriate standards, particularly the former factor. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。