頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 社會福利最大一定好嗎?--一個雙占模型之探討=How is Maximum Social Welfare?--A Duopoly Model Analysis |
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作 者 | 葉金標; 王澤諺; | 書刊名 | 經社法制論叢 |
卷 期 | 39 2007.01[民96.01] |
頁 次 | 頁211-242 |
分類號 | 553.5 |
關鍵詞 | 社會福利; R&D外溢效果; 研發聯盟; 卡特爾; Social welfare; R&D spillover; Research joint venture; RJV; Cartelization; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 傳統經濟學討論大都以社會福利為目標,然而理論卻又告訴我們,經濟個體是理性且以自利為出發點,因此在追求社會福利最大下,消費者和廠商的福利有時是無法同時兼顧。現實社會除非政府強制干預,否則消費者與廠商應以自己本身利益極大為目標,因此本文擬討論廠商在策略聯盟選擇下,如何獲得利益極大,另外消費者在廠商的策略聯盟下,如何選擇消費者剩餘最大。本文以D'Aspremont and Jacquemin(1988)的雙占研發模型為架構,並參考Kamien et. al(1992)策略聯盟方式區分,R&D競爭模型、R&D卡特爾、RJV卡特爾、RJV競爭和政府規範社會福利等五種狀況。依上述模型推導本文共可得以下幾點結論(1)就研發成果而言,在RJV卡特爾和政府規範社會福利下,研發成果最多。(2)就社會總產量而言,在政府規範社會福利下的總產量最大,R&D卡特爾情況下最低。(3)就總生產者剩餘而言,R&D卡特爾獨占鰲頭,R&D競爭模型則墊底。(4)就消費者剩餘而言,當n≥1.8時政府規範社會福利的消費者剩餘最大,在n<1.8且ß>0.7為RJV卡特爾、 n<1.8且ß≤0.7則為R&D競爭模型的消費者剩餘最大;當n≤1.1時政府規範社會福利的消費者剩餘最小,其他狀況下為R&D卡特爾。(5)就社會福利而言,在ß<0.3以RJV卡特爾的社會福利最佳,ß≥0.3則為R&D競爭模型;而R&D卡特爾在社會福利的評比為最後一名。(6)研發的外溢效果將影響研發成果、市場總產量、消費者剩餘、總生產者剩餘與社會福利的大小。(7)在本文的五種情況假設下,社會福利最大下,有可能為消費者剩餘也最大;然生產者剩餘卻與社會福利背道而馳,在生產者剩餘最大下,社會福利反而最小。 |
英文摘要 | This paper developed by D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992). We make five types of strategic alliance, in which R&D competition, R&D cartelization, RJV cartelization, RJV competition, Government norm. Major findings of these comparisons are (1) RJV cartelization and Government norm yields the most R&D efforts. (2) Government norm yields the most quantity, and R&D cartelization yields fewest one. (3) R&D cartelization yields the highest producer surplus, and R&D competition yields the lowest one. (4) In consumer surplus, when n≥1.8 Government norm yields highest. However when n<1.8 and ß>0.7 RJV cartelization yields the highest consumer surplus, but when n<1.8 and ß≤0.7 R&D competition is the highest one. When ≤1.1 Government norm yields the lowest consumer surplus, but the other situation R&D cartelization is the lowest. (5) In social welfare, when ß<0.3 RJV cartelization is the highest, but ß≥0.3 R&D competition become highest. However, R&D cartelization yield the lowest social welfare. (6) The R&D spillover influence R&D effort, total quantity, consumer surplus, total producer surplus, and social welfare. (7) In our five type of strategic alliance, the highest social welfare possible exists with the highest consumer welfare at the same time. However, the producer surplus diverges from the social welfare as the highest producer surplus also exists with the lowest social welfare. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。