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題 名 | 胡塞爾於現象學中面對上帝問題的態度=Husserl's Two Attitudes towards the Problem of God in His Phenomenology |
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作 者 | 羅麗君; | 書刊名 | 揭諦 |
卷 期 | 4 2002.07[民91.07] |
頁 次 | 頁303-307+309-332 |
分類號 | 147.71 |
關鍵詞 | 上帝問題; 目的論; 超越性; 現象學還原; 靜態現象學; 發生現象學; Gottesproblem; Problem of God; Teleologie; Teleology; Transzendenz; Transcendence; Die phanomenologische Reduktion; The phenomenological reducktion; Die statische Phanomenologie; The static phenomenology; Die genetische Phanomenologie; The genetic phenomenology; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文旨在說明胡塞爾於其現象學研究中面對上帝問題的兩種態度,以及這兩種態度分別與靜態現象學和發生現象學間的內在關係,進而探討胡塞爾如何以其現象學立場出發而去思考上帝問題的可能性。通過現象學存而不論的方法,胡塞爾將所有存有者還原為於意識中被意向呈現的顯相,世界亦被描述為純粹之意識經驗,是於時間中被給予之多樣顯相的意向性統一體。然而,因為上有學之「超越性」不能作為一種意識「現象」而呈現,所以應該透過現象學還原而被放入括弧、存而不論,據之也不能談論超驗自我對上帝現象的構成問題。這是胡塞爾在靜態現象學研究中面對上帝問題的態度。然而,在時間中被給予之多樣顯相的意向性統一體是在超驗自我之絕對意識中被構成的,故現象學研究必要從靜態分析進而探討現象之普遍發生起源,面對超驗自我之意向性本質的源起問題。基於這個問題,胡塞爾提出了於發生現象學研究立場上面對上帝問題的態度。因為發生起源的問題不僅使現象學去探討絕對意識對世界之其目的性的構成原由,同時也迫使現象學超過絕對意識的領域去設想一種完全不同的絕對存有者,即上帝,作為所有存有實在的存有學上的最終原因的可能性。也因此,上帝問題可被包含在胡塞爾研究的範圍之中。 |
英文摘要 | This essay aims to examine Husserl's two attitudes towards the problem of God in his phenomenology. I explore how these attitudes are internally connected with the development of Husserl's phenomenological Research from the static to genetic analysis, and then, I indicate how the problem of God can be stated in phenomenological terms and how it arises within the context of Husserl's thought. The point, however, is to determine, strictly within the framework of the analysis of transcendental subjectivity, the specific and rather indirect way in which the being of God comes to be cognized by the transcendental ego. With the aid of the phenomenological epoche, Husserl tries to trace being (das Seiende) back to its intentional appearing in and for absolute consciousness. The being of the world occurring in it is considered and described purely as experiences of consciousness, as "appearances" and reveals itself as an intentional unity of a temporally given manifold of appearances. On the other hand, however, the "transcendence" of God can not appear to absolute consciousness as a "phenomenon", so that it is put into brackets anyway through the epoche. Thus, we also can not speak of a "constitution" of this phenomenon by the transcendental ego. This is Husserl's first attitude in the static phenomenology toward the problem of God. However, the intentional unity of a temporally given manifold of appearances is something transcendentally constituted in the absolute consciousness of the pure ego. With this supposition, phenomenology must develop itself from the static analysis to a genetic analysis and is faced with the question of the origin of intentionality in the transcendental ego. With this question, Husserl gives another attitude toward the problem of God in his genetic phenomenological Research. This question not only leads phenomenology to seek the teleological constitution of the being of the world in "absolute consciousness", but also prompts phenomenology to go beyond absolute consciousness to a radically different being, to the ultimate "Absolute", viz., "God," as the ontologically ultimate source of all reality as such. For this reason, the problem of God necessarily belongs to the problem-complex of Husserl's research. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。