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題 名 | 論善與存有的形上關係--多瑪斯對分享觀點及本性觀點的超越=On the Metaphysical Relation of Good and Being-Thomas, and Participation and Nature |
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作 者 | 張正陽; | 書刊名 | 哲學與文化 |
卷 期 | 26:12=307 1999.12[民88.12] |
頁 次 | 頁1157-1167+1188-1189 |
分類號 | 141 |
關鍵詞 | 分享觀點; 分受觀點; 本性觀點; 善的超越性; 善的先驗性; 普遍性論題; 存有即善; 善即存有; 流出說; 創造說; 類比關係; Participation; Nature; Transcendency of good; A Priori of good; Universal argument; Being is good; Emanatism; Creationism; The Analogous relation; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 希臘哲學傳統對於「善的形上學」之研究, 可以分為兩個主流:一是以柏拉圖為主的「分享觀點」,主張所有的理型和因此而來的存有,都分享著「善」。另一種看法,則是以亞理斯多德為主的「本性觀點」,主張等同「善」和「目的」。因此,一個自然實體的目的、完成或完美,即是完全實現其自身特有的能力,此即那個實體的目的,也是那個實體的善。不過,這兩種觀點都持有一個共同的看法,此即,任何存在(物)都是「善」的,這就是所謂的「普遍性論題」。雖然有著相同的論題,它們仍持不同的見解:前者認為每一存在(物)都分享著上帝之至善;後者則認為一物之善,就其自性而言,本來就是善的。換言之,這兩個觀點分別指出了「善」一方面普遍超越所有的範疇而「內在」於一切存有之中,一方面卻又以上帝之絕對至善而「超越」一切存有。在這對立的兩種觀點之下,究竟要如何 聯結才能使彼此相容而不衝突,乃成為本文的主題。因為,一旦肯定了「分享觀點」自然就會否定「本性觀點」,反之亦然。是以,多瑪斯以其巧智把「善的先驗性」置於「神聖屬性」的架構之下,終能化解這個難題。 本文以波耶修士《周期論》(De Hebdomadibus)一文中所引發的問題,開啟了這個形上難題的探索。文中說明了多瑪斯如何從不同的角度,以「本性觀點」闡明了存有與善的關係。接著,又以「分享觀點」將諸有之善與神聖絕對之至善聯結在一起,一舉解決了存有與善這個多年來的形上難題。 |
英文摘要 | The study of “metaphysics of good” in Greek philosophy can be traditionally divided into two fashions: one is the Platonic “participation” which claims that all forms and their copies partake in the Form of the Good. The other is the Aristotelian view of “nature”, which claims that good and telos are the same. Thus, the achievement of telos of a natural substance is the actuation of its own capacity. To achieve its own telos is to achieve its own good. However, these two views hold a common opinion: all beings are good, which is the so-called “universal argument”. Although they hold the same opinion, yet they have different ways of expressing it. The former thinks that every being partakes in the good of God; the latter thinks that the good of a substance is good in terms of its nature. In other words, these two views point out respectively that “good”, on the one hand, transcend all categories and “internalizes” in every being; on the other hand, God is the absolute good and transcends every being. These two views are in conflict. The purpose of this paper is an attempt to solve the conflict between these two views. For, once we take the “view of participation”, naturally the “view of nature” will be denied, and vice versa. So, Thomas solves the problem by putting “the transcendence of good” under the structure of “divine attributes”. This paper starts Boethius” De Hebdomadibus, and gives an account of how from different viewpoints Thomas explains the relation of being and good in terms of the “view of nature”. And it further explores how Thomas appealing to the view of participation” connects the good of everything and the divine good, which solves the metaphysical conundrum of being and good. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。