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題 名 | A Defense of Millikan's Teleosemantics=為密勒坎(Millikan)的目的論語意學辯護 |
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作 者 | 藍亭; | 書刊名 | 國立政治大學學報 |
卷 期 | 79:1 1999.12[民88.12] |
頁 次 | 頁1-38 |
分類號 | 801.6 |
關鍵詞 | 語意學; 目的論; 心靈表徵; 天擇; 說明; Semantics; Teleology; Mental representation; Evolutionary selection; Explanation; |
語 文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 對密勒坎目的論觀點之語意學的主要批評是皮托司基(Pietroski)的指控﹕ 1.在密勒坎的理論中可能心靈表徵與引起它們的肇因完全不連貫;2.密勒坎沒有提出對其 理論的否證條件;3.她的觀點極端且不能提供充分的動機;4.她忽略了未被選擇的分辨能 力可能在意向性說明中扮演的角色;以及5.她把目的論及意向性的說明混為一談。 雖然皮托司基的批評,特別是第一項,直覺上有某種程度的說服力,但我論證它的實 質內涵並不若表面所呈現的重要,且不能對密勒坎的語意學構成挑戰。此外,我嘗試說明 密勒坎的理論不只適用於天擇的個案,也適用於人類的學習。再者,我提出了密勒坎的理 論中,那些部分予以修改或許是適當的,而那些部分在我們達到某種概念上的澄清及更了 解相關的經驗科學資料之前,是不能有所進展的。 |
英文摘要 | Typical of the criticisms leveled at Millikan's teleosemantics are Pletroski's charges: (1) under Millikan's theory it can be the case that items of content are completely disconnected from that which causes them; (2) Millikan fails to identify conditions that would count against her theory; (3) her view is radically revisionary but she provides no independent motivation for it; (4) she ignores the role unselected discriminating abilities may play in intentional explanation; and, (5) she conflates teleological and intentional explanation. Although Pietroski's criticisms, especially (1), have a measure of intuitive appeal, 1 argue that they are less substantial than they might appear and that they do not constitute a serious challenge to Millikan's semantic theory. 1 defend Millikan's position through conceptual analysis, thought experiment, and data from evolutionary biology. To demonstrate how teleosemantics can be expanded, 1 attempt to show it is applicable not just to cases of evolutionary selection, but also to human learning. Furthermore, I identify places where revision of Millikan's theory might be in order and places where we are unlikely to make substantial progress until we achieve certain conceptual refinements and a greater understanding of relevant empirical phenomena. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。