頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 以議價方式改善雙邊獨占配銷通路合作的問題=Improving Channel Coordination through Bargaining in Bilateral Monopoly |
---|---|
作者 | 林瑞益; | 書刊名 | 管理與系統 |
卷期 | 9:3 2002.07[民91.07] |
頁次 | 頁369-384 |
分類號 | 494.7 |
關鍵詞 | 配銷通路力量; 製造商領導; 零售商領導; 垂直Nash均衡; 談判議價; 垂直整合; Channel power; Manufacturer's stackelberg; Retailer's stackelberg; Vertical nash; Bargaining; Vertical integration; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 近年來,由於零售業者朝向連鎖化、大型化及多功能化之趨勢發展,不斷的增強零售業對上游製造商在產品價格之影響力,使得傳統配銷通路力量由上游製造商領導方式,逐漸演變為零售商與製造商相互協商議價的方式。本文探討在單一上游生產者與單一下游零售商雙邊獨占市場時,配銷通路力量如果是讚單方領導方式,轉變為由通路成員談判議供方式時,對於生產者利潤、零售商利潤與消費者剩餘,是否會有正面之影響。其中,配銷通路力量之形態有五種:製造商領導(MS)、零售商領導(RS)、垂垂Nash均衡(VN)、談判議價(BN)、與垂直整合(VI)。在線性需求函數之條件下,由本文之分析結果得到:1.不論是就生產者剩餘或消費者剩餘而言,配銷通路以上下游垂直整合(VI)或同時議供批發價與零售邊際利潤之Nash議價方式(BN(w,n))為最佳,其次則為單項談判議價方式(BN(w)或BN(n)),再次則為垂直Nash均衡之(VN)方式,而以製造商領導或零售商領導(MS、RS)之配銷通路最差。2.配銷通路領導廠商可透過與對手協商議價方式,來提升自己與對手之利潤水準與消費者福利。3.議價單項價格模型可以有效的縮小雙重邊際化的情形,並優於垂直Nash模型。4.同時議價批發價與零售邊際利潤之Nash議價公式,可以發揮協調上下游廠商,並達到垂直整合均衡解水準之機制。 |
英文摘要 | Due to inexorably rising scale of retail establishments, the monopoly power of modern distribution channels for consumer products have been apparent shift from upstream manufacture to the downstream retailer. In this paper, we explore the role of bargaining arrangements in improving coordination between channel members. By using the methods from the game-theory literature in marketing, we analyze the effect of five different types of channel power on the distribution of channel profits as well as consumers' surplus. The five different types of power structures between one manufacture and one retailer include: two Stacklberg games (manufacturer-Stackelberg: MS and retailer-Stackelberg: RS)、vertical Nash game(VN)、bargaining games(BN) and vertical integration(VI). With a linear demand function, there are several key insights from our analysis. 1) The relative priority of five different types of power structures is that: Both of the vertical integration (VI) and the bargaining of wholesale's price and retailer's margin simultaneously (BN(w,n)) are the best types power structure; the bargaining of single variable (wholesale's price or retailer's margin) game is the second choice; the vertical Nash game(VN) is the third choice; and the Stacklberg's leader type power structure is the worst one. 2) The Stacklberg's leader can make a Pareto improvement to all channel members, if the stacklberg's leader releases his channel power and become a bargaining game player. 3) The bargaining of single variable will result in higher profits thatn vertical Nash game, due to double marginizations can be reduce more effectively in the bargaining process. 4) With the bargaining of wholesale's price and retailer's margin simultaneously, the bargaining game can duplicate the cannel members to achieve the results as does the vertical integration. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。