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題 名 | 語言的邊際--論《莊子》的「弔詭」=The Margins of Language--On Zhuang Zi's Paradox |
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作 者 | 蔡偉鼎; | 書刊名 | 哲學與文化 |
卷 期 | 28:10=329 2001.10[民90.10] |
頁 次 | 頁949-972+975 |
分類號 | 121.33 |
關鍵詞 | 莊子; 維根斯坦; 惠施; 弔詭; 自我指涉; 語言觀; 卮言; 語言遊戲; Zhuang Zi; Wittgenstein; Hui Shi; Paradox; Self-referential; View of language; Gui Ci; Game of language; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 歷來有不少現代的中國哲學研究者企圖以西方哲學思想來澄清中國哲學思想中的問題。其中之一就是有關道家語言觀的問題。道家對語言的看法是相對於「道」而言的,其主張「道不可言說」;因為語言是一種有限的表達工具,無法再現出「道」自身,因而能夠說出的都不是「道」。這種看法會造成一種自我矛盾的弔詭問題,從而否定道家經典文獻的存在價值。曾有人以早期維根斯坦(Wittgenstein)在《邏輯哲學論叢》中「可說/不可說」的區分,來解釋《莊子》一書中的語言觀。這種說明往往僅以「維根斯坦曾如是說」就匆匆賦予從「可說」到「不可說」間之轉折的合法性。但是,鑒於後期維根斯坦對前期觀點有所批判與修正,因此其早期語言觀的缺點必定也會是人們挪用其觀念來詮釋《莊子》時所碰到的問題。換言之,逕直拿其早期語言觀來證成我們對《莊子》的詮釋,反倒是更有問題的。促成此問題的原因正在於學者並沒有真正深入去探討語言的本性,而是持舊有素樸的語言觀點來套用。但是,我們可以維根斯坦為殷鑑,經由他晚期的理論來思考《莊子》的弔詭問題,並提出更具說服力的消解之道。本文主要分以下三節來加以論證:(一)自我指涉與弔詭──從語言分析指出弔詭在邏輯結構上為自我指涉的,並陳述西方哲學界如何處理此問題;(二)維根斯坦與弔詭──以後期維根斯坦的觀點指出,自我指涉並非是純然無意義的、不可取的;(三)惠施詭辭與弔詭──指出弔詭在《莊子》一書中有其存在的必要性。 |
英文摘要 | Many modern researchers have tried to clarify the issues of Chinese philosophy in terms of western philosophy, and one of those issues is the Daoist view of language. Daoists value language against Dao, claiming that Dao “can not be said”; language is a limited tool of expression that can’t re-present Dao itself, therefore anything that can be said is no Dao. Such a view would cause a paradox that negated the value of Daoist classics. The view about language in Zhuang Zi was once analyzed in terms of Wittgenstein’s distinction between “what can be said” and “what can’t be said” in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Yet regarding the legitimacy of the transition from “what can be said” to “what can’t be said”, such analysis provides us with little more than saying” as Wittgenstein said.” Yet considering that Wittgenstein said.” Yet considering that Wittgenstein in his late period criticized his own views in the early period, we can be certain that the prolems with Wittgenstein’s early views about language will also be found in the analysis of Zhuang Zi. In other words, to interpret Zhuang Zi in terms of Wittgensitein early views is something even more problematic, for those scholars did not meaningfully examine the nature of language but simply applied the early native views of language. However, keeping Wittgenstein’s change of views in mind, we can consider the paradox of Zhuang Zi with his later views about language and have a more persuasive solution. This paper presents the argument in three steps: first, self-referential paradox-to pint out that paradox is self-referential in logic structure and how the issue is handled in western philosophy; second, Wittgenstein and paradox-to point out in terms of Wittgenstein’s later views that being self-referential not necessarily equals to being nonsensical and useless; third, Hui Shi’s “gui ci” (sophism) and paradox-to point out the essentiality of paradox to Zhuang Zi. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。