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題名 | 論接合子是不是位格人=Is the Human Zyagte a Person? |
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作者 | 艾立勤; Aldrich, Rev Louis G.; |
期刊 | 哲學與文化 |
出版日期 | 20010800 |
卷期 | 28:8=327 2001.08[民90.08] |
頁次 | 頁691-715+773-774 |
分類號 | 242 |
語文 | chi |
關鍵詞 | 接合子; 位格; 人的本質; 人的生命; Zygote; Person; Human nature; Human life; |
中文摘要 | 科學、醫學、哲學、神學和公共政策的一個最關鍵的問題,就是接合子(zygote)的位格性(personhood)。為了進行幹細胞研究,必須把初期的胚胎(囊胚期)加以破壞;為了進行試管嬰兒胚胎植入,必須處理「特」初期的胚胎;除此之外,還有後服避孕藥的道德價值等等,我們在評估這些問題時,接合子到底是不是位格人,是一大關鍵。 本文的第一部份企圖舉證駁斥一般用來否定接合子之位格性的相關證據。怎樣才叫做一個「人」?我們一般最普遍的定義是:一個具有理性本質的個體。而一般用來否定結合子之位格性的說法,一是否定接合子的「個體性」(例如初期的胚胎可能形成雙胞胎),二是否認接合子具有理性本質(例如以亞里斯多德的生物學和哲學為基礎所提出的「延緩的過程」的說法)。本文將試圖說明,現代生物學和遺傳學的發現顯示,這些說法是誤信了謬誤的事實(例如亞里斯多德錯誤的生物學),再不然就是言過其實(例如,現在人類科技已經有可能複製成年人,如果胚胎有形成雙胞胎的可能性就表示接合子沒有個體性,那就連成年人也不算位格人了)。 本文的第二部份將提出積極的證據來證明接合子的位格性。這些積極證據必須證明兩件事:第一,人類的接合子具有理性本質;第二,接合子具有獨立的個體性。要證明第一點,我們必須接受一個前提—本性不同於功能,也就是說,理性本質先於功能。換言之,每個人都具有理性本質,即使是剛出生的嬰兒,雖然還不具有理性生物的功能,但仍然具有理性本質。基於這個前提,加上馬里旦(Jacques Maritan)的認識論,以及現代的發展生物學和遺傳學當中有關於人類接合子的經驗事實,我們可以斷定,接合子具有人的位格性,就像我們不會懷疑一個三歲的小孩是位格人,是相同的道理。至於第二點(人的個體性)是基於一個前提—只要是生物科學所肯定的生命,就是一個獨立的有機體—這也許就是哲學所謂的獨立個體。事實上,現代生物學和遺傳學清楚說明了接合子就是一個獨立的有機體。所以我們可以斷定接合子是個獨立個體,就像一匹馬、一條魚和一個變形蟲一樣。因此,既然證明了人類的接合子是個具有理性本質的獨立個體,接合子是位格人,也就毋庸置疑了。 |
英文摘要 | On of the most critical questions in science, medicine, philosophy, theology and public policy is the status of the human zygote. The status of the human zygote as person or non-person is critical in evaluation such matters a destroying early embryos (blastocyte stage) for sake of stem cell research, the handing of the “extra” early embryos created rot the sake of in-vitro fertilization, the moral evaluation of so-called “morning after” pills, etc. The first part of this paper will attempt to demonstrate that the common “proofs” that the zygote is not a person do not hold. The most general definition of person is: an individual substance with a reasonable nature. The proofs against the personhood of the zygote either deny the “individuality” of the zygote (for example, because of the fact twining is possible for an early embryo) or else deny that zygote possesses a reasonable nature (for example, the delayed humanization arguments based on Aristotle’s’ biology and philosophy). We will try to show that the most modern discoveries in biology and genetics reveal such proofs to be simply using false facts (for example, Aristotle’s mistaken biology) or else they prove too much (for example, since cloning of adults is now possible, if the possibility of twining is a proof against individuality, then even adult humans are not persons). The second part of this paper will attempt a positive proof of the personhood of the zygote. This positive proof must demonstrate two thins: first, that the human zygote possesses a reasonable nature; second, that the human zygote is an individual substance. The first aspect of this proof involves the acceptance of the following premise: nature is not the same as function, that is , to possess a reasonable nature is prior to function. That means, all members of the human species have a reasonable nature, even if, as in the case of the just born infant, they are not yet able to function as reasoning beings. Using this premise, Jacques Maritain’s epistemology about how natures are known, and the empirical facts about the human zygote demonstrate by modern developmental biology and genetics, we can conclude that the zygote possesses a human nature with the same degree of certainty with which we assert a three year old child possesses a human nature. The second aspect of the proof is based on the premise that any being which biological science assert is an individual organism, may be assumed to be what philosophy calls an individual substance. In fact, modern biology and genetics clearly demonstrate the zygote is an individual organism, substance as a horse, a fish, an amoeba, etc. Hence, having demonstrated the human zygote is an individual substance possessing a rational nature, it follows that the human zygote is a person. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。