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題 名 | Equilibrium Analysis of Binary Contributions to Incremental Public Goods=連續性公共財與間斷性私人捐獻 |
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作 者 | 宋玉生; | 書刊名 | 經濟論文叢刊 |
卷 期 | 28:1 2000.03[民89.03] |
頁 次 | 頁95-114 |
分類號 | 564.6 |
關鍵詞 | 公共財; 二元捐獻; 所得移轉; Public goods; Binary contribution; Warm glow; Strategic transfers; |
語 文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 本文探討連續性公共財之私人捐獻均衡。在我們的模型中消費者只有二元性(或謂間斷性)之選擇:即完全不捐獻,或是認捐一固定額。本文首先討論此種二元私人捐獻之Nash均衡及質特性。一般而言,此均衡雖必然存在,但並非唯一。當有多數均衡時,我們認為其中之一應是最有可能出現之焦點,此我們稱之為「排序捐獻均衡」。其次,我們進一步考慮自發性之策略所得移轉,意即較偏愛公共財之消費者會將其所得分給不願捐獻者以誘使其加入捐獻之列。此種自願性之所得移轉對眾人皆有利,故將可促進Pareto之效率性。因此本賽局之最終均衡狀態將是在此所得移轉完成後之結果,此我們稱之為「策略移轉均衡」。 |
英文摘要 | We analyze a special arrangement for private provision of continuous public goods: people can only choose between contributing a pre-specified amount or not contributing at all. Contributors then derive utility from the act of contribution itself as well as increased amount of public goods. We first characterize Nash equilibria of such contribution games, paying special attention to the ordered contribution equilibria (OCE). Though the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies is guaranteed, its uniqueness is not. The OCE, we claim, is the arguable focal point. We further consider the possibility of voluntary strategic transfers, by which high-demanders of the public good may choose to subsidize non-contributors to induce them to contribute. The ultimate outcome, called strategic transfer equilibrium (STE), can only emerge after all such Pareto-improving possibilities are exhausted. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。