頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 「接續性獨占」,共謀理論,與「最高轉售價格維持」約定=Successive Monopoly, Collusion, and Maximum Resale Price Maintenance |
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作者 | 陳志民; | 書刊名 | 法政學報 |
卷期 | 9 1999.01[民88.01] |
頁次 | 頁63-100 |
分類號 | 553.74 |
關鍵詞 | 最高轉售價格維持; 接續性獨占; 共謀; 掠奪性訂價; 修曼法; 當然違法; 合理原則; Maximum resale price maintenance; Successive monopoly; Collusion; Predatory pricing; Sherman act; Per se illegal; Rule of reason; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 於美國反托拉斯法下,上游廠商就下游廠商之最高轉售價格所作之約定,一直為 美國聯邦最高法院認定為當然違反修曼法之限制交易類型。 此項看法在 1997 年的 State Oil v. Kahn 一案中被正式推翻,法院改以「合理原則」作為審理相關案件之標準。 State Oi1 一案展現美國最高司法機構逐漸擺脫拱形式化的法律原則作為判決之基礎,轉而強調最 高轉售價格限制的功能性分析之趨勢。也即,最高轉售價格之違法性,並不能單單植基於價 格決定自由不容被剝奪的理論上,而是需透過對該交易限制之市場效果為經濟評估方能求得 一要適之答案。此等改變,非但對美國司法實務將產生重大影響;從反托拉斯法學之角度來 看,該案也可視為是針對管制者長期以來就市場價格限制約定所抱持之戒慎恐懼態度的再省 思。本文擬對美國反托拉斯法對最高轉售價格維持之司法演變,從經濟與法律之觀點,為一 詳細之介紹與分析。就經濟理論部分,本文將著重在最高轉售價格維持所具有的解決市場「 接續性獨占」功能及法院以往所賴以制裁最高轉售價格的共謀理論爭之介紹。就法律部分, 本文將就確立最高轉售價格維持應適用當然違法原則之 Albrecht 案,以及下級法院如何透 過反托拉斯法律原則之運用以因應對 Albrecht 案不斷升高的批評聲浪,終致最高法院廢棄 該項原則為一歷史性之敘述與分析。文末以美國法之經驗對我國公平法之解釋與政策制定所 引含之啟示作結。 |
英文摘要 | It had been held for decades by the U.S. Supreme Court that agreements between manufacturers and distributors fixing the maximum resale price levels were per se illegal under the Sherman Act. The Court relinquished such a view in State Oil v. Kahn of 1997 and declared in that case that maximum resale price maintenance would be reviewed under the rule-of-reason standard. State Oil reveals a trend under which the Court gradually departs itself from basing antitrust decisions primarily on the mechanical application of established legal doctrines such as the freedom to determine one's own prices. Instead, functional analysis in the sense that the legality of maximum resale price maintenance be determined by an evaluation of its potential market impacts would now be relied upon more favorably by the Court in trials. Not only will this change of reviewing standard be meaningful for antitrust practitioners, it also represents a reconsideration from the Court regarding antitrust regulators' quite critical view on any price agreement among market participants. This article intends to present a detailed introduction and analysis of this issue from both economic and legal points of view. With respect to economic theories, I focus on how procompetitively maximum resale price maintenance could be used to resolve the "successive monopoly" problem and how, according to the Supreme Court, it could be abused to facilitate collusion. In light of legal theories, I will first offer a historical account of how the per se rule was applied to cases concerning maximum resale price maintenance, in particular the Albrecht rule, followed by a analysis of the lower courts' modification of the reasoning in Albrecht developed to accommodate the rising criticisms of that case. In addition, the Court' s holdings in State Oil will be introduced in this part. I conclude this article with a discussion on how American experience could shed light on the enforcement of Article 18 of the Fair Trade Law in Taiwan. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。