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題名 | 馬里旦關於自由和位格的關係=Relation of Person and Freedom in Maritain |
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作者 | 艾立勤; 張梵; Alorich, Rev. Louis G.; |
期刊 | 哲學與文化 |
出版日期 | 19980400 |
卷期 | 25:4=287 1998.04[民87.04] |
頁次 | 頁360-370+398-399 |
分類號 | 146.75 |
語文 | chi |
關鍵詞 | 接受; 存在; 行使存在; 位格; 自由; 不消滅; 歷史哲學; 詩的直覺; 馬里旦; Received existence; Exercised existence; Person; Freedom; Non-nihilation; Philosophy of history; Poetic intuition; Maritain; |
中文摘要 | 本文旨在以馬里旦自立性理論、 詩的知識理論以及他論及神的與人的自由的關係等三層觀點,來檢視馬里旦思想中位格與自由的關係。希望在分別闡述了這些不同領域的關係之後,能夠綜合出馬里旦有關於位格與自由之間關係的整個思想來。根據馬里旦的自立性理論,本性的接受存在透過自立性的活動而提昇到能行使存在的狀態。在這樣的說法中,個人憑藉自由地行使他的本性(即透過尊重他自己與其他人的本性真理和透過慷慨與超越本性上的限制),而成為一完滿的位格;然而,位格也可因自由地耽溺於自我中心與自私自利而不再發展,停滯在僅身為物質個體。就自立性來看,自由似乎是個人存有之主動的、正面的行使;不過就詩的知識來分析,存在的行使主要並非作為主動的活動。馬里旦認為,詩的知識要求一種自由地忍受他人的真理,也要求詩人的主體性與世上事物兩者間有意向的結合。這樣的忍受需要有精神上的被動性,但若論及人對良善行為的貢獻,甚至這被動性也不發生作用。在說明神的與人的自由之間關係時,馬里旦堅持一切道德的善來自天主之自由的、可被中斷的、「與良善相一致的行為」。就此行為的成立來說,人沒有功勞。不過,人可能消滅、因而中斷了天主的行為--這便構成道德上的惡行。這麼說來,人的最自由的活動是「不消滅」,就是自由地不去阻礙、反而讓天主的良善行為透過我而開花結果。因此,自由的首要意義似乎不是積極的主動性也不是消極的忍受,而是自由地不行動。我們如何將這種種的看法綜合起來呢?我們可以簡要地說:我們通常「覺得」最自由的行為只是間接的自由,這行為取決於一較基本的自由行使,即被動地忍受他人的真理;而這樣的被動性接著又取決於人位格中最基本的自由行為;那就是,藉由不消滅天主的良善行為而與天主合作。 |
英文摘要 | This paper examines the relationship between person and freedom in Jacques Maritain. This relationship is explored from three points of view: Maritain's theory of subsistence; his theory of poetic knowledge; his theory on the relation of divine and human freedom. After explication this relationship in each of these different areas, a synthesis of Maritain's overall thought concerning the relationship of person and freedom is attempted. According to Maritain's theory of subsistence, the “received existence” of the nature is elevated to the state of exercising through the subsistent act. In this theory, an individual, by freely exercising his nature (by respecting the natural truths about himself and “others” and by transcending these limitations through generosity and love), becomes a full person. By freely giving into egoism and selfishness, however, the person fails to develop and remains merely a material individual. In the context of subsistence, freedom seems to be an active, positive exercise of one's being. In the context of poetic knowledge, however, the exercise of existence is not analyzed primarily as an “activity”. Maritain tells us that poetic knowledge, which requires an intentional union between the poet's subjectivity and “things in the world”, demands a free “suffering” of the truth of the other. This suffering demands a spiritual passivity; but when speaking of man's contribution to the good moral act, even this passivity disappears. In explaining the relationship of divine and human freedom, Maritain holds that all moral good has its source in God's free but breakable “movement in the line of the good”. To this movement man contributes nothing. Man may, however, nihilate the movement of God, thus breaking it--this would be a morally evil act. Man's supreme free act then becomes “non-nihilation”, that is freely not obstructing but permitting God's good movement to reach its fruition through me. Thus, freedom seems to be primarily not a positive activity, nor a passive suffering, but freely not action. How to synthesize these various perspectives? Briefly we can say that what we usually “feel” to be our most free activity is only indirectly free. This activity depends upon the more fundamental exercises of freedom in passively suffering the truth of the other; this passivity in turn depends upon the most fundamental free act of the human person: cooperating with God by not nihilating His good movement. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。