查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 風險、固守職位與經理人契約=Risk, Entrenchment and Managerial Contract |
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作 者 | 詹家昌; 劉維琪; 吳欽杉; | 書刊名 | 企業管理學報 |
卷 期 | 41 1997.10[民86.10] |
頁 次 | 頁33-58 |
分類號 | 494.23 |
關鍵詞 | 固守職位; Entrenchment; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 在本文的模型中,風險中立的股東必須激勵經理人選擇最適風險的投資計畫。經 理人報酬函數的曲度若為產出的函數,就會影響經理人面對投資風險的態度。因而經理人控 制風險與固守職位的相互抵銷效果,將決定經理人薪資函數的最適曲度,且股東所採取的薪 資策略與投資計畫的風險有密切關係。本文證明當投資風險的選擇不可觀察時,股東將在特 定條件下承擔投資的效率損失;當投資風險的選擇可觀察時,股東會以凸性薪資契約,誘使 經理人選擇最高風險之投資計畫。 |
英文摘要 | In this model, risk-neutral shareholders have to motivate managers to choose the optimal risk of investment projects by using different compensation contracts. The curvature of managers' compensation contract as a function of output will affect their attitude toward investment risk. The optimal curvature depends on the trade-off between risk controlling and managerial entrenchment. There is a close relationship between the return of the compensation strategy and risk taking. This paper has demonstrated that the shareholders will have an efficiency loss when the investment alternatives are unobservable and under some specific conditions. When the choice of risk taking can be observable, the owners will induce managers to select higher risky investments by a convex compensation contract. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。