頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | Policy Enforcement with Voluntary Participation and Infinite Penalties=提高廠商守法率之賽局機制設計 |
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作 者 | 宋玉生; | 書刊名 | 經濟論文叢刊 |
卷 期 | 27:4 1999.12[民88.12] |
頁 次 | 頁461-482 |
分類號 | 445.9 |
關鍵詞 | 政策執行; 訊息賽局; 自行申報; Probabilistic enforcement; Signaling; Self-reporting; |
語 文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 本文以「污染管制」為例, 提出一個能夠促使廠商減少污染排放的簡單機制。 一般情形下,政府管制機關(環保署)多受制於法律政策與執行經費之雙重限制,因而無法 如其所願讓廠商確實遵行其規定。就政策而言,環保署常無法以重罰之規定嚇阻違規者。在 經費上,環保署有限之人力物力亦常讓投機廠商私下有機可乘,暗中違規。我們在文中所提 出之訊息賽局機制則可以幫助環保署清楚區分守法廠商與違規廠商,據此將其有限之資源經 費鎖定在後者之上,因而提高守法廠商之比例與環境品質。我們首先分析二元排放與連續性 排放之情形,並顯示本文機制之優點。其次,我們亦探討廠商需自行申報其污染量之情形。 在結合自行申報與我們的安局機制後,廠商之守法比例將更加理想。我們同時發現,本機制 除了對社會環境品質有益之外,亦可節省政府管制單位之稽查經費。雖然本文以污染防治為 說明背景,本機制尚可應用在很多方面(如逃漏稅)。而由於此機制之設計十分簡單,實用 性高亦成為其主要優點。 |
英文摘要 | In this paper we propose a simple signaling game structure that will make the EPAs monitoring of polluting firms more effective. When the EPA is constrained in policy instruments and has a limited enforcement budget, the task of emission monitoring can only be carried out incompletely. Our simple design allows complying and non-complying firms to be distinguished. No further inspection efforts are to be wasted on complying firms. As a result, in equilibrium, more "firms become compliant, and even persistent poUuters will reduce their emissions. In addition, we demonstrate that further gains can be had if the common practice of selfreporting is combined with our design. In our model, there are benefits to the society, as total pollution emissions decline. There are also gains to the government since more tax revenues will be generated in the monitoring process. Though our analysis is conducted in the context of environmental management, the concept and conclusions are applicable to many other situations, including government regulations of occupational safety requirements, general law enforcement and tax evasion. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。