頁籤選單縮合
題名 | Entrepreneurs, Technological Choice and Financial Friction= |
---|---|
作者 | Chiang,Yeong-yuh; |
期刊 | 經濟論文 |
出版日期 | 19960900 |
卷期 | 24:3 1996.09[民85.09] |
頁次 | 頁351-373 |
分類號 | 555.42 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | 企業家; 技術選擇; 信用分配; Entrepreneur; Technological chice; Credit rationing; |
英文摘要 | This paper provides an analytical explanation for McKinnon's argument that the economy with financial intermediation (FI) can choose technologies which requires greater amounts of investment than the economy without FI. FI eliminates redundant monitoring costs which are required to implement the contract of borrowing and lending. Such reduction enables the optimal contract to accommodate larger amounts of investment that it would otherwise. In contrast to Williamson's model with exogenous borrowers and lenders, borrowers and lenders are endogenously determined in this paper. In a specific parametrical version of the model, the share of effective entrepreneurs in the population is negatively associated with monitoring costs and interest rates. The extend of credit rationing is positively associated with monitoring costs and interest rates. The results of this paper are consistent with Bernanke's nonmonetary effect of financial crises. In addition, by interpreting monitoring cost as information cost, the results can be applied to explain the ubiquity of medium and small sizes of enterprises in the Taiwan economy. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。