頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 非對稱訊息,企業家異質性,與均衡之信用分配=Asymmetrical Information, Entrepreneural Heterogeneity, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing |
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作 者 | 陳禮潭; | 書刊名 | 經濟論文 |
卷 期 | 26:3 1998.09[民87.09] |
頁 次 | 頁271-301 |
分類號 | 555.42 |
關鍵詞 | 信用分配; 代理成本; 異質性企業家; 非對稱訊息; 內部淨值; Credit rationing; Agency cost; Heterogeneous entrepreneur; Asymmetric information; Internal net worth; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文主要探討,在非對稱訊息下, 信用分配與企業家內部淨值之間的相互關係。 從事後的不完全訊息概念切入,本文嘗試從一種相當簡化的模型來分析信用分配的現象,並 解析信用分配之所以會發生的原因。 本文的模型與其他模型主要的不同在於同時考慮:(1) 非齊一性之企業家的計劃效能,為其私有且為他人無法觀察到的訊息。(2) 審計抽查是隨機 性的。(3) 引進資產負債之淨值(或是借款擔保品)的變數,用來解釋經濟體糸內的信用分 配的現象。本文的基本結論是:只要資產淨值不足於擔保借貸契約完全履行,信用分配的現 象就會發生。因此,透過隨機性抽查對代理成本的現響,信用分配存在與否,社會資產淨值 的多寡扮演重要角色。 |
英文摘要 | The purpose of this paper is to analyze credit market equilibrium with costly state verification. We study an environment in which the production ability of entrepreneur is heterogeneous and unknown, and output is asymmetrically informed between lenders and borrowers. It is shown that under a pooling equilibrium in credit market, a credit rationing of the type discussed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) may exist. Our mechanism is as follows. A lower social net worth would cause an increase in teh lender's agency costs when entrepreneurs are financing investment projects. Higher agency costs lead to less efficient investment, which in turn renders lenders to supply lower credit than the need of entrepreneurs. As a consequence, a credit rationing occurs in equilibrium. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。