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題名 | Investment Decisions of Duopoly in Differential Games=微分遊戲下複占廠商的投資決策 |
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作者 | 林正寶; Lin, Jeng-bau; |
期刊 | 國立中興大學臺中夜間部學報 |
出版日期 | 19971100 |
卷期 | 3 1997.11[民86.11] |
頁次 | 頁297-367 |
分類號 | 563.52 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | 投資決策; 微分遊戲; 外在衝擊; Stackelberg失衡; Investment decisions; Differential games; Exogenous shocks; Stackelberg disequilibrium; |
中文摘要 | 本文把 Nerlove-Arrow 資本累積方程式導入線型需求及二次成本函數架構中,以 建立一完全訊息的微分遊戲模型。 在此微分遊戲中,吾人探討 Stackelberg 模型的複占廠 商的動態投資決策。 一般而言,由於領導廠商的投資決策之不確定性,追隨廠商的資本運動對外在衝擊的反應是 複雜的。不過,在某些特定的條件下,每廠、整個產業、甚至來自於外生衝擊的某些輔助變 數所引起的每人資本量對模型參數變化的反應方向,大致是可以確定的。從推動可知,領導 廠商長期需要擁有較追隨廠商為多的資本量。但市場條件及利率的變化可能會改變兩廠原來 的地位。 兩廠在投資方面彼此競爭的結果將造成不當競爭及超額產能的「 Stackelberg 失 衡」問題。 另一方面,由於兩廠同時對外在衝擊所作的複雜反應,模型參數的變化對兩廠初期投資的影 響效果是不明確的;然而,一廠初期資本量對另一廠初期投資的影響有其負面的效果。 |
英文摘要 | By introducing the Nerlove-Arrow capital accumulation equation into the linear demand and quadratic cost framework, a differential game model with complete information is constructed. The dynamic investment decisions of duopoly in such games are investigated in the Stackelberg model. In general, the responses of the follower firm's capital motion to exogenous shocks are complex due to the indeterminacy of investment decisions of the leader firm. However, the signs of changes in per capita capital for each firm, the whole industry, and even some costate variables arising from exogenous shocks are almost determinate under some specific conditions. It is clear from inference that in the long run the leader firm wants to have a larger quantity of capital stocks than the follower firm. The market conditions and interest rate changes may alter the original positions of the two firms. As a result, the two firms compete in investment each other, thus leading to the problem of improper competition and excess capacity which is known as a "Stackelberg disequilibrium." On the other hand, the effects of changes in the model parameters on initial investment of firms are ambiguous because the two firms respond sophisicatedly to these shocks at the same time, while the changes in one firm's initial capital stock have the opposite effects on the other firm's initial investment. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。