頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | Bonus Contracting in Oligopolistic Markets=寡頭壟斷市場與獎金契約 |
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作 者 | 張安民; | 書刊名 | 經濟論文叢刊 |
卷 期 | 22:2 1994.06[民83.06] |
頁 次 | 頁219-235 |
分類號 | 553.724 |
關鍵詞 | 寡頭; 獎金契約; 壟斷市場; |
語 文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 本文對寡占產業中所使用「獎金契約」提出了一個新的理論分析。我們 的模型排除了Lewis(1981)所提出的「獎金契約」之激勵效應(Incentive effct)。本文 指出,寡頭廠商之所以會發給一次總付獎金可能係出于戰略上的考慮;與純粹的 「激勵契約」相比,在均衡時,這種獎金機制會導致產品價格下降,廠商利潤下 降,與增進社會福利。 |
英文摘要 | This paper presents an analysis of bonus compensationcontracting in the context of an oligopolistic industry.In a model that abstracts from the incentive effect ofbonus contracting identified by Lewis (1980), it is foundthat strategic consideration alone can give rise to lumpsum bonus payments in equilibrium. It is also foundthat the strategic use of bonus contracts by oligopoliststends to reduce product prices, reduce firms' profits,and improve social welfare relative to their using pure"incentives contracts" obtained in a standard principalagent framework. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。