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| 題 名 | Are Managers Punished for Crash Risk? Evidence from China=管理層會因為公司股價崩盤風險而受到處罰嗎?--來自中國的經驗證據 |
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| 作 者 | Chu, Jian; Fang, Junxiong; Kim, Jeong-bon; Zhou, Yi; | 書刊名 | 中國會計與財務研究 |
| 卷 期 | 21:4 2019.12[民108.12] |
| 頁 次 | 頁109-146 |
| 分類號 | 553.97 |
| 關鍵詞 | 股價崩盤風險; 薪酬; CEO被解僱; 制度因素; 公司治理; Crash risk; Compensation; CEO dismissal; Institutional factors; Corporate governance; |
| 語 文 | 英文(English) |
| 中文摘要 | 本文考察股价崩盘风险是否会影响公司管理层的薪酬和 CEO 被解雇概率。研究发 现,伴随着高企的股价崩盘风险,管理层薪酬会显著降低,CEO 被解雇概率会显著提 升,这意味着管理层承担了高股价崩盘风险的负面后果。进一步研究发现,股价崩盘 风险的上述后果在公司为国有企业、完成股权分置改革后、地处市场化程度较高的省 份时更显著。采用变化回归模型和工具变量方法的结果表明是股价崩盘风险导致管理 层薪酬和 CEO 被解雇概率发生变化,而非相反。最后,本文还发现 CEO 被解雇后股 价崩盘风险显著下降,表明因股价崩盘风险而处罚管理层的行为策略是有效的。 |
| 英文摘要 | This study examines how stock price crash risk affects subsequent managerial compensation and CEO dismissal rate. We find that managerial compensation significantly decreases and dismissal rate significantly increases following high crash risk, indicating that managers bear the negative consequences of high crash risk. Moreover, we find that the effects of crash risk are more pronounced for state-owned enterprises, after the split-share reform, and for firms located in provinces with higher levels of marketisation. Results from change regressions and an instrumental variable approach suggest that high crash risk causes changes in managerial compensation and dismissal rate, not vice versa. Finally, our evidence suggests that the punishment of managers for high crash risk is efficient in the sense that crash risk significantly decreases after CEO dismissal. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。