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題 名 | 半總統制民主國家的總理選擇=Prime Ministerial Selection in Semi-presidential Democracies |
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作 者 | 顏煌庭; | 書刊名 | 臺灣民主季刊 |
卷 期 | 17:1 2020.03[民109.03] |
頁 次 | 頁1-44 |
分類號 | 572.5 |
關鍵詞 | 代理損失; 政治生涯; 總理; 半總統制; Agency loss; Political career; Prime minister; Semi-presidentialism; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文探討什麼因素決定半總統制民主國家的總理選擇,並提出憲法異質性和策略環境決定政治(或官僚)型總理是否被任命。首先,本文提出一種區別總理類型的二分法:政治和官僚型總理,而總理的政治生涯與可以獲得的政治資源有關,因而反映代理損失範圍。其次,憲法異質性決定總理主要的委託人是總統或國會。最後,四個策略環境(單一政黨主導、聯盟主導、雙極對抗和多極分裂)影響總統或國會是否願意承擔代理損失風險,以換取其政黨選舉前景的改善。總結來說,本文認為無論誰負責總理任命,比起雙極對抗,官僚型總理很可能在單一政黨主導下被任命。此外,多極分裂下,當總統而不是國會有權任命總理時,官僚型總理很可能被任命。本文蒐集385個半總統制民主國家內閣的資料,並採用邏輯回歸來檢驗這些論點。 |
英文摘要 | This article examines the factors structuring prime ministerial selection in semi-presidential democracies, and proposes that constitutional heterogeneity and strategic environments determine whether a political (or bureaucratic) prime minister is chosen. First, political and bureaucratic prime ministers are identified based on their political careers, which relate to political resources they can acquire and, thus, mirror the scope of agency loss. Second, constitutional heterogeneity determines the primary principal, that is, a president or a parliament. Finally, four strategic environments-single party dominance, coalition dominance, bipolar antagonism, and multipolar fragmentation-are differentiated, and influence if principals are willing to run the risk of agency loss in exchange for improved electoral prospects. In combination, this paper argues that a political prime minister is less likely to emerge under single party dominance than under bipolar antagonism, regardless of who is in charge of naming prime ministers. Further, under multipolar fragmentation, a bureaucratic prime minister is chosen when presidents, instead of parliaments, have the power to appoint prime ministers. This article tests these arguments using data from 385 cabinets of semi-presidential democracies and employing logistic regression. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。