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相關文獻
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頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | CEO權力、員工分紅與公司績效=CEO Power, Employee Bonus, and Firm Performance |
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作 者 | 陳晏儀; 盧正治; 盧正壽; | 書刊名 | 全球商業經營管理學報 |
卷 期 | 9 2017.09[民106.09] |
頁 次 | 頁83-98 |
分類號 | 494.328 |
關鍵詞 | CEO權力; 員工分紅; 員工分紅費用化; 公司績效; CEO power; Employee bonus; Expensing employee bonus; Firm performance; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本研究以1996年至2015年國內上市櫃公司為研究對象,主要探討CEO權力與員工分紅政策之間關係,並研究分紅費用化新制是否影響有權力CEO的員工分紅決策,最後則釐清CEO權力如何影響公司績效與員工分紅之間關係。實證結果發現,當公司CEO權力愈大,員工分紅水準愈高,顯示有權力的CEO可能基於私利動機而傾向發放高額的分紅。另外員工分紅費用化新制確實能夠降低公司的員工分紅水準,然而有權力CEO的員工分紅政策卻未受到分紅新制實施的影響,證實當公司CEO權力愈大,控制權愈高時,愈難受到外在制度的約束。此外員工分紅能夠提升公司的未來績效,說明員工分紅是項有效的激勵制度。反觀CEO權力則會減損公司績效與員工分紅之間的正向連結,顯示CEO權力愈高,愈可能過度發放分紅,而浪費內部資源,並降低公司績效。 |
英文摘要 | This thesis examines listed firms in Taiwan from 1996 to 2015 to investigate the relationship between CEO power and employee bonus policy, and explore whether the expensing employee bonus policy has effects on the employee bonus decision of powerful CEO. Finally this paper demonstrates how CEO power influences the relationship between firm performance and employee bonus. The empirical results indicate that the more power the CEO, the higher bonus the employee, showing that the powerful CEOs tend to pay higher employee bonus based on private incentives. Furthermore, the implementation of expensing employee bonus policy can really reduce the level of employee bonus and enhance the firm's future performance, however, it has no effects on powerful CEO's employee bonus decision indicating that powerful CEO are difficult to be monitor by the external system as his entrenchment controlling position. On the other hand, CEO power diminish the positive relationship between firm performance and employee bonus, indicating the more powerful CEOs tend to overpay employee bonus resulting in internal resources inefficiency and poor firm performance. Finally, the results also found that expensing employee bonus policy can really enhance the positive relationship between firm performance and employee bonus policy, showing that it can improve the efficiency of firm's employee bonus decision. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。