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題名 | The Valuation and Incentive Effects of Executive Stock Options under the Consideration of Firm Default=考量公司違約下的經理人股票選擇權的評價及激勵效果 |
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作者 | 呂進瑞; 林建義; 黃志強; Lu, Jin-ray; Lin, Chien-yi; Hwang, Chih-chiang; |
期刊 | 管理與系統 |
出版日期 | 20170100 |
卷期 | 24:1 2017.01[民106.01] |
頁次 | 頁19-46 |
分類號 | 563.55 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | 激勵效果; 違約效果; 經理人股票選擇權; 承擔風險; Incentive effect; Default effect; Executive stock options; Risk-taking; |
中文摘要 | 經理人股票選擇權契約的評價不僅考量公司股票價格是否超越履約價格,也涉及公司價值是否足夠支付應許的債務及薪資支付。考慮公司潛在的違約風險,本文發展一個經理人股票選擇權的定價模型,著重於分析契約評價、經理人激勵效果、公司違約效果及兩者的策略行為。我們的結果指出經理人有動機去努力工作及承擔風險因而提升契約價值,但這些動機水準與經理人股票選擇權契約的設計及公司的策略行為息息相關。另外,若公司應付債務及薪資支付是較大的,則公司較可能違約。 |
英文摘要 | The valuation of executive stock options (ESOs) depends not only on whether the stock price exceeds a strike price, but also depends on whether the firm value is sufficient to cover debt repayment and salary compensation owed to employees. We propose an option pricing model for ESO contracts with a risk generated from the option writer's potential for defaulting. This study focuses on the analysis of valuations, executive incentives, firm defaults, and the two parties' respective strategic behaviors. We support that executives have incentives to enhance contract value by increasing their effort or risk-taking, but these incentives are correlated to the design of the contract and a firm's strategies. If the total of debt repayments and salary compensation is greater, the firm has a greater likelihood of defaulting on the ESO contract. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。