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題名 | 無礙反攻?「中美共同防禦條約」簽訂後的說服與宣傳=No Restraints on Counter-attack? Propaganda and Persuasion after the Signing of the United States-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 |
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作者 | 張淑雅; | 書刊名 | 國史館館刊 |
卷期 | 48 2016.06[民105.06] |
頁次 | 頁103-105+107-174 |
分類號 | 645.2 |
關鍵詞 | 中美共同防禦條約; 反攻大陸; 反共抗俄; 自由民主; 革命民主; U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty; Re-conquering the Mainland; Anticommunism and opposing Russia; Liberal democracy; Revolutionary democracy; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 中華民國政府(以下簡稱國府)有關「中美共同防禦條約」(以下簡稱防約)的內部說服與宣傳,以及臺灣報刊的回應,比一般所認知的要複雜。國府經過數年的努力,終於爭取到象徵加入世界反共抗俄同盟的防約之後對國內解釋防約的內容,尤其有礙反攻的部分,完全不敢掉以輕心。首先得說服行政、立法部門與軍方接受防約內必要的妥協,不要公開表示歧見,以免有礙雙方立法機構的批准。接著設法讓人民接受並歡迎防約,以強化並提升國府國際合法性與國內正統性的政治效益。面對要激勵士氣,同時得避免挑釁的宣傳困境,國府在宣傳上強調防約保臺與反共的功能、淡化反攻與防約之關聯,並屢屢聲明國策不變,以顯示防約確實「無礙反攻」。官員、民代與報刊雜誌對防約的反應,顯示當時各方對反攻復國目標的高度認同與支持,也對防約可能「有礙」或至少「無助」反攻提出嚴厲的質疑,同時還批判美國領導反共與國府領導反攻都不夠積極;儘管如此,卻無人主張放棄防約,認知到反攻復國鬥爭的長期性。民營報刊還藉著防約第三條的內容,呼籲國府將各種制度自由化,讓「政治反攻」先行。此種呼籲不免強化自由民主派報刊與宣示要行「革命民主」的國府之間早已開始的摩擦,加速日後雙方的衝突,這是以往討論防約及國府政治迫害等研究未曾注意到的環節。 |
英文摘要 | The propaganda and persuasion of the Republic of China (ROC) regarding the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States were more difficult and complicated than heretofore being recognized. After years of tireless push, the ROC finally signed a defense pact with Washington, which symbolized its partnership in the free-world anti-Communist crusade thus elevate its international legitimacy. Due to the speculation that the Treaty in fact re-leashed the ROC from "Re-conquering the Mainland," the Nationalist government did not take internal acceptance of the treaty for granted. First, it had to persuade high ranking Party members, the Executive Yuan, the Defense Department, and members of the Legislative Yuan to accept the necessary restraints on military actions and to approve the treaty. Then it had to convince the public that the Treaty would not thwart the national goal of "Reconquering the Mainland". Since it also had to pacify U.S. fear for getting involved in its mainland adventure, the Nationalists chose to emphasize the Treaty’s effect of allying with anti-communist crusade and guaranteeing Taiwan’s security, while downplaying the connections between the Treaty and counter-attack. Legislators and media appeared to support the goal of ultimate returning to the mainland wholeheartedly, though they did not shy from questioning possible restraints of the treaty. However, all agreed to accept rather than reject the Treaty. Furthermore, the private media, citing the commitment in Article III of the Treaty, tried to promote the government's respect of freedom of speech, human rights, and to loosen its control on the economy, so as to attract the admiration and support of the people on the mainland, a first step of "Re-conquering the Mainland". Such urge inevitably heightened the existing tension between the ideas of "Revolutionary Democracy" and "Liberal Democracy," and might have sped up future prosecution of liberals such as Lei Chen. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。