頁籤選單縮合
| 題 名 | Qizhi zhi xing 氣質之性 and the Unity of Human Nature: Zhu Xi's Theorization of the Goodness of Human Nature=氣質之性與一性論：--朱熹的性善論論證 |
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| 作 者 | 李定桓; 李定桓; | 書刊名 | 儒教文化研究 |
| 卷 期 | 25 2016.02[民105.02] |
| 頁 次 | 頁1-27 |
| 分類號 | 125.5 |
| 關鍵詞 | 氣質之性; 性善論; 一性論; 不相離; 不相雜; 朱熹; Qizhi zhi xing; The thesis that human aature is good; The unity of human nature; The mutual non-separability; Bu xiang li; The mutual non-fusionablity; Bu xiang za; Zhu Xi; |
| 語 文 | 英文(English) |
| 中文摘要 | 孟子的性善論從發生初期就是道學最重要的理論基礎。盡管如此，道學內部對這一命題的論證過程還是體現出對於人的本性的道德規定與其範疇的複雜問題。具體來說，由於以普遍性和純粹道德性為前提，性善論看似與不善的發生和各人道德性的差異等經驗性的事實互相矛盾。為了解決這樣的問題，朱熹 (1120-1200)重新概念化了張載和二程兄弟的理論︰氣質之性與一性論觀念。 第一，朱子從普遍的人的本性和個人的氣質之間不相離的角度重新解釋了氣質之性的概念。通過這一解釋，朱子在個人稟賦氣質的差異對人的本性的發顯過程的影響觀點上，提出了對個人之間生得的道德資質的說明。同時，朱子從不相雜的觀點出發，把氣質的影響範圍限定在本性的發顯過程，而不及於本性本身 (本然之性 )。從而在概念上，使本性本身摆脱氣質的影響，由此從理論上論證性善論。 第二，為了在更堅定的基礎上重新樹立性善論，朱子有必要重新定義人的本性與感官欲求之間的關係。在傳統上，感官欲求被認為是不善的最重要原因。因此，兩者不能輕易包含在一個概念裏。一方面，如果把這兩者認定為獨立的兩個實體，這就將人的本性槪念兩分為道德性和非道德性兩個獨立原因的下部範疇。這分明會弱化性善論。為了解決這個問題，朱子從本性外沒有一切事物的一性論的觀點出發，把感官欲求納入到人本性的範疇中，規定其特徵為︰感官欲求的非道德傾向性不是從人的本性本身發生的，而是在其本性發顯過程中所發生的非本質的、偶然的、非正常的事態。 朱子通過對從道學初期持續而來的這兩個問題的解釋，最終在全中國知性史上首次對人的本性的道德性下了正論。 |
| 英文摘要 | The thesis that “human nature is good” was a key doctrinal foundation of the Daoxue tradition since its beginning. Nonetheless, the process of verifying this thesis revealed intricate problems concerning the moral definition of human nature and its categorization. In particular, because of its implications of universality and pure goodness, this thesis seems to contradict the empirical facts of the occurrence of immorality and the individual disparities in moral characters. In order to address such problems, Zhu Xi 朱熹(1120-1200) adopted the ideas of qizhi zhi xing 氣質之性and the unity of human nature from Zhang Zai 張載 (1020-1077) and the Cheng brothers through re-conceptualizations. First, Zhu Xi re-interpreted qizhi zhi xing in the sense of the mutual non-separability (bu xiang li 不相離) of the universality of human nature and the personal qualities of qizhi. Thus, he provided an explanation for observed disparities in moral character in the light of the influence of the personal quality of the endowed qizhi on the manifestation process of human nature. At the same time, from the perspective of the mutual nonfusionablity (bu xiang za 不相雜), he confined the range of qizhi’s influence to the manifestation process alone, rather than to human nature itself, thus making human nature itself conceptually free from the influence of qizhi and theoretically capable of retaining its quality of pure goodness. Second, to re-establish the thesis that human nature is good on a more solid ground, Zhu needed to redefine the relationship between human nature and sensory desires. Because the latter had been conventionally marked out as the primary cause of immorality, they could not be simply integrated into one concept. On the other hand, when separating them into two distinct entities, this would divide the concept of human nature itself into the two subcategories as the distinct origins of morality and immorality, which also would make the moral definition of human nature ambiguous. To solve this problem, on the side of the all-embracing unity of human nature, Zhu included sensory desires into the category of human nature and explained their tendencies toward immorality as nonessential, accidental anomalies occurring in the process of the manifestation of human natur as the sole ultimate origin of all, rather than directly stemming from human nature itself. By addressing these two remaining problems, Zhu eventually established Mengzi’s thesis of the goodness of human nature as the orthodox view on this subject for the first time in Chinese intellectual history. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。