頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 重大資本支出後的經營績效:成長機會與公司治理的角色=Corporate Performance after Substantial Capital Expenditure: The Role of Growth Opportunity and Corporate Governance |
---|---|
作 者 | 黃旭輝; 黃一祥; 張志向; | 書刊名 | 臺大管理論叢 |
卷期 | 22:1 2011.12[民100.12] |
頁次 | 頁297-325 |
分類號 | 553.97 |
關鍵詞 | 資本支出; 公司治理; 成長機會; Capital expenditure; Corporate governance; Growth opportunity; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文主要想回答二個問題,首先,公司在重大資本支出後的經營績效是否會優於其產業的水準?其次,什麼樣的公司在資本支出後會有較佳的績效表現?我們以1999 至2003年固定資產淨值增加20% 以上的267 個台灣上市公司作為研究樣本。實證結果顯示,就整體樣本而言公司在歷經重大資本支出後的經營績效並未一致性的優於或低於產業的水準。其次,我們也發現成長機會、內部人持股、獨立董事和家族企業對於資本支出後的經營績效具有顯著正向的影響,若公司的董事會規模較小以及薪酬制度的激勵效果較大,其資本支出後的績效表現也較佳。最後,我們發現治理機制較佳的公司對低成長公司在資本支出後的績效提升更為顯著。 |
英文摘要 | This paper seeks to answer the following questions. Does corporate performance outperform the market after substantial capital expenditure? Which firms perform better after substantial capital expenditure? Our sample includes 267 companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange whose net fixed assets have increased by more than 20% during 1999-2003. Our evidence shows that companies do not consistently outperform the market after substantial capital expenditure. Furthermore, we find that companies with higher growth opportunities, higher insider shareholdings, independent directors, a smaller board of directors, a more incentive-based compensation structure or that are family-controlled perform better after incurring capital expenditure. We also find that the performance of firms with independent directors, higher managerial shareholdings or that are family-controlled is enhanced more significantly in the case of low-growth companies. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。