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題名 | 論先驗對象之歧義--一個分析與評論=On the Ambiguity of Kant's Concept of Transcendental Object |
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作者 | 王浩仁; | 書刊名 | 止善 |
卷期 | 6 2009.06[民98.06] |
頁次 | 頁167-182 |
分類號 | 147.45 |
關鍵詞 | 康德; 先驗對象; 表象之客觀性; 先驗統覺; 推論知性; Kant; Transcendental object; Objectivity of representations; Transcendental apperception; Discursive understanding; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 《純粹理性批判》中的先驗對象概念是有歧義的。在〈先驗辯證論〉裡,先驗對象是指(傳統上的)形上學對象,可包括物自身。但A版〈範疇先驗演繹〉中,它主要指經驗知識所符應的不可知某物=X,代表了現象在意識中的必然綜合統一。然而,即使在同意它有歧義的學者當中,也有人認為這種歧義不僅存於〈辯證論〉與A版演繹之間,甚至在A版演繹中亦有此歧義。而在A版演繹中之歧義,乃是一種不得已的退縮,即那個X原本在A版演繹之開頭應該是指物自身,但因物自身不可知,康德才被迫轉而用它指涉現象之必然綜合統一。這種退縮並未在根本上改變物自身才是先驗對象的傳統想法,也因此會有造成先驗對象論述內部不一致之危險。1968年Henry Allison的一篇專題文章,就展現了這種觀點。我認為這個解釋不符康德本意。先驗對象=X在A版演繹的一開頭就不是指物自身,而只是個不具明確概念的'X',表示傳統的知識對象概念是空洞模糊的。要弄清知識對象概念,必須追溯使得某個X能呈現的思想條件,可稱之為先驗對象之觀念。總之,「某物一般=X」應當與「先驗對象之觀念」區分。後者是現象在意識中的必然綜合統一,而前者並非物自身,而只是一個(模糊的)某物=X。故在A版演繹中的相關論述並無不一致,而先驗對象概念的歧義只是用於〈範疇先驗演繹〉(它是知識的)與〈先驗辯證論〉(它是批判傳統形上學的)之不同討論脈絡所致。 |
英文摘要 | Kant's concept ot the transcendental object in his First Critique has an ambiguity. In Transcendental Dialectic, it signifies the metaphysical object, including the thing in itself, but in A-edition Transcendental Deduction of Categories, it stands for a something unknown=X, corresponding to our empirical knowledge. It's condition of possibility is the necessary unity of consciousness in the synthesis of appearances. Howerer, even in the context of A-edition Deduction, some commentators claimed that Kant is further involved n a questionable transition from a thing-in-itself to the formal unity of consciousness. This equals to an inconsistent move from a transcendental realism of thing-in-itself to the transcendental idealism. Because of the unknownability of that X, Kant withdrew from discussing it properly, and escaped into his theory of the formal unity of consciussness. Henry Allison's paper 'Kant's Concept of the Transcendental Object' (1968) represented such an interpretation. I refute Allison's interpretation as misunderstanding Kant, Throughout the A-edition Deduction, the transcendental object=X does not stand for a thingin-itself at all. It's so-called 'proper meaning' is only an empty representation =X. The thing-in-itself is too clear to be its meaning. In order to clarify it, Kant can only inquire the condition of thought of such an empty representation. This condition is the necessarily synthetic unity of consciousness in appearances. I call it the Concept of the transcendental object. The relation between that empty X and this Concept is just the relation of the conditioned to its condition. Hence, although the transcendental object has indeed an ambiguity, the ambiguity is not inside the A-edition Decuction. |
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