頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 聯合行為、虛偽不實表徵及營業誹謗之研究--以獨占競爭廠商之最適價格、廣告與研發策略為例=A Study on Union Behavior, Not Solid Advertising, and Business Slander--An Analysis of Optimal Price, Advertising and R&D Strategies for a Monopolistic Competition Firm |
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作 者 | 翁逸群; 游志青; 鄭詩華; | 書刊名 | 公平交易季刊 |
卷 期 | 16:1 2008.01[民97.01] |
頁 次 | 頁57-94 |
分類號 | 553.721 |
關鍵詞 | 聯合行為; 不實廣告; 營業誹謗; 獨占競爭; 策略; Union behavior; Not solid advertising business slander; Monopolisic competition; Strategy; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 依據行銷理論,非價格競爭工具包括廣告、研發、售後服務、分期付款及行銷通路選擇等,其中往往以廣告和研發最受重視。因此,價格、廣告及研發策略之組合,便是廠商考慮採行的行銷策略。若從經濟面來觀察,不完全競爭市場之廠商為了獲取利潤,可能會採聯合行為、虛偽不實表徵或營業詐謗之不法作為。有鑑於止,本文乃建立動態累積銷售模型,以Pontryagin法之極大化原理來導出:獨占競爭廠商於合法作為或非法作為時,最適價格、廣告及研發決策並衡量政府對其處予罰鍰之金額。 在模型之命題上,本文共導出8項命題;從中發現:累積銷售量之影子價格是影響價格、廣告與研發策略之重要因素;且此三種策略變數間是存在部份替代關係。在某些參數條件成立時,政府研發與廠商研發,這兩者間是存在負向關係。且廠商不法作為之罰錢大小會依聯合行為所選擇之協議變數或不實廣告內容而有所不同。而這些結果均與當前其他動態累積銷售模型之結論有很大不同。 |
英文摘要 | According to marketing theory, non-price competition tools, including advertising, research and development, after sales service, payment by installments and marketing circuit choice and so on, are often taken into serious consideration in advertisements and research and development. Therefore, based on a combination of pricing, advertising and a research and development strategy, the firm can consider the marketing strategy that it should select. If looked at from an economic point of view, firms in imperfect1y competitive markets, in order to make a profit, will possibly select union behavior, and not solid advertising or business slander. From these, the authors establish the dynamic accumulative sales model, the principles of which are based on the Pontryagin law. Regardless of whether a monopolistic competition firm engages in legal behavior or illegal behavior, the optimal price, advertising and R&D decisions can be made, and the amount of the fine to be imposed by the government can also be computed. A total of eight propositions are derived in this article. It is discovered that the shadow price of the accumulative sales volume affects the price, the advertising and the research and development strategies. In addition, the variables for these three kinds of strategies are partial substitutes. Under certain parameter conditions, the government’s research and development and the merchant’s research and development exhibit a negative relationship. In addition, the firms’ illegal fines depend on the impact of the union's behavior on the solid advertisements. However, the results and conclusion reached by other current dynamic accumulative sales models are very different. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。