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題 名 | 標的為擁擠性公共財的競租分析=Rent Seeking for Public Goods with Congestion |
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作 者 | 翁仁甫; | 書刊名 | 經社法制論叢 |
卷 期 | 38 民95.07 |
頁 次 | 頁211-237 |
分類號 | 564.37 |
關鍵詞 | 擁擠性公共財; 競租; Public goods with congestion; Rent-seeking; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文延伸Katz et al.(1990)競租標的為純粹公共財的討論,將標的公共財在消費上所可能存在的敵對性納入考慮,在兩個或多個地區(集團)彼此相互競逐擁擠性公共財的設定下進行競租分析。我們首先針對影響競租支出水準的因素以及競租支出水準的評量問題進行討論,發現包括地區居民人數規模、競租標的擁擠性高低,以及地區間居民人數規模差異程度大小等因素,都是決定均衡社會競租支出水準高低以及進行社會競租支出水準評估時的關鍵影響因素,這與 Katz et al.(1990)在標的為純粹公共財的設定下,發現均衡社會競租支出水準不會受地區居民人數規模大小以及不同地區居民人數規模差異程度高低影響的結論有所差異。其次,我們也在地區居民人數相同的設定下,進一步針對競租標的社會淨效益的評估與控制問題進行討論,發現如果以控制均衡社會競租支出水準為目標,則競租結構設計者應選擇擁擠性較高的公共財為競租標的,同時透過減少參與競逐的地區數量以及選定由居民人數較多的地區參與競逐活動,來達成降低社會競租支出水準的目的。然而,若以社會淨效益為從事競租結構設計的主要考量因素,則為了確保競租標的之社會淨效益大於零,競租結構設計者應該選定擁擠性較低的公共財為競租標的,再透過儘量朝向限定由少數大規模(高居民數)地區參與競逐活動的方向設計競租結構,以進一步提高社會淨效益水準。本文的結論可以作為政府當局提撥經費補助其轄下地區建置公共設施或服務時,進行相關補助制度設計的重要參考依據。 |
英文摘要 | This paper extends the discussion of rent-seeking for pure public goods in Katz et al. (1990). We take into consideration the probable rivalness in consumption of public goods, and conduct rent-seeking analysis under the premise that two or more locations (groups) seek for public goods with congestion. First, we focus on questions of the measurement of rent-seeking expenditure. We find: the number of residents in each location, the degree of congestion of rent-seeking target, and the difference of the number of residents among locations will indeed all be important factors affecting the measurement of social rent-seeking expenditure. Second, we engage in discussions of control and measurement of net social benefit of rent-seeking target under all locations with the same numbers of residents. We find that if the goal is to control the equilibrium social rent-seeking expenditure, rent-seeking structure designer should choose public goods with higher congestion as rent-seeking target. At the same time, the designer can reduce the social rent-seeking expenditure by decreasing the number of rent-seeking locations and choosing locations with more residents to participate in rent-seeking game. On the other hand, if the goal is control the net social benefit, rent-seeking structure designer should choose public goods with lower congestion as rent-seeking target in order to keep positive the net social benefit of rent-seeking target. At the same time, the designer can further increase net social benefit by limiting the number of rent-seeking locations and choosing locations with more residents to participate in rent-seeking game. Our conclusions provide government suggestions to design grant system when providing funds for locations under its jurisdiction to establish public facilities or services. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。