查詢結果分析
來源資料
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題名 | 不同分租方式下的群體競租行為分析=Rent-Seeking of Competitive Group with Non-Identical Sharing Rules |
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作者 | 歐俊男; | 書刊名 | 科技學刊 |
卷期 | 9:1 2000.01[民89.01] |
頁次 | 頁49-58 |
分類號 | 553.721 |
關鍵詞 | 競租行為; 競租群體; 遞增分租率; 攫租率; Rent-seeking; Competitive group; Increasing sharing rules; Dissipation of rent; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本研究旨在探討傳統競租文獻中,關於競租群體分租方式的問題,除了對Nitzan (1991a)分租方式加以檢討之外,文中也提出遞增(或遞減)分租方式的概念。以一個兩競 租群體的模型,分析個別競租群體採取不同分租方式時,對其競租行為預期利益與經濟租攫 租率的影響。本研究主要分為兩個部份,首先是競租群體採取相同策略時,由最適解作出經 濟租、競租者人數與分租方式的比較靜態結果。其中,以經濟租變化的影響方向較為明確, 其餘則須視情況而定。其次是當群體採取不同程度的遞增分租方式,同為遞增或遞減分租方 式的兩群體,較高遞增分租方式的群體確實處於較有利的地位,除了支出較高的競租支出之 外,也得到較高預期利益。但是,在一群體採遞增分租,另一群體採遞減分租下,遞增租群 體則不全然在有利的地位,在某些情況下,群體甚至可能因為過度鼓勵競租支出,造成群體 的競租者面對較低或是負數的預期利益。至於在攫租率的衡量上,分析結果則顯示隨分租率 遞增程度越高,體系也會越傾向過度攫租。 |
英文摘要 | In this paper I try to establish new sharing rules of competitive groups. In conventional researches, Nitzan's sharing rules, by which economic rent was shared according to equity and contribution, may sometimes make competitive groups collapse. So I generalize the rules, supposing that competitive groups share economic rent in increasing or decreasing rules. There are two major parts in this paper. First, competitive share groups share economic rent in identical rules, probably in increasing or decreasing rules. Based on reaction curves, rent seeker's optimal rentseeking expenditure and expected profit are determind in comparative analysis. Secondly, if competitive share groups shared economic rent in different rules, could the group tuat adapts increasing sharing rule get higher expected profit? In most time it is true, but not always. The numerical results also show that when both groups share rent in increasing rules, no one can get more benefit from rent seeking activity. At last, the dissipation of rent will be higher as the increasing degree of sharing rules increase. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。