查詢結果分析
來源資料
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| 題 名 | 從臺灣大案例論裁判解任及假處分在公司治理中之定位=A Study on the Governance Functions of Court's Removal and Suspension of Directors |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 方嘉麟; | 書刊名 | 政大法學評論 |
| 卷 期 | 83 2005.02[民94.02] |
| 頁 次 | 頁103-196 |
| 分類號 | 587.25 |
| 關鍵詞 | 公司治理; 假處分; 裁判解任; 經營權爭奪; 交叉持股; 金字塔持股; Corporate governance; Injunction; Courts' removal of directors; Battle for corporate control; Cross shareholding; Pyramid shareholding; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 從臺灣大等案例可看出我國裁判解任及假處分設計，實務上涉及許多問題致公司治理成效不彰。查，裁判解任是為彌補常態治理機制失靈，法院例外介入監控的設計，而裁判解任前的先行停權假處分，則是避免經營者濫權、損害持續擴大，法院不得不採取之緊急措施，然實務運作卻顯示上開設計遭有心人士濫用，與立法目的背道而馳。 就裁判解任設計目的以觀，是防止大股東操縱，使股東汰換不適任的經營者，達到此目的至少有三項前提，首先，被解任的董事確為公司經營者，然我國公司法第二十七條的法人代表人制度，往往使董事淪為傀儡，而大股東隱身於幕後。其次，解任的成本須屬合理，倘僅內部人方能掌控關鍵資訊指摘不法，資訊取得成本勢將大幅限制，削弱裁判解任制度之使用，然我國公司資訊揭露顯有待 改善，財務透明度亦偏低，就臺灣大電信集團本身錯綜複雜的轉投資，交叉持股情況而言，資訊成本相對提高。最後，大股東操縱應被裁判解任制度有效遏止，但我國要求訴請裁判解任，需先行召開過股東會，會中未通過解任決議此點，仍賦予大股東相當操縱空間，使裁判解任制度自然名存實亡。 以臺灣大一案為例，法院為假處分時，容許以擔保代釋明之不足，而幾乎完全未為實質審查，取得假處分裁定就相當於獲取了經營權，事實發展亦顯示訴請裁判解任已無必要，法院也不可能有機會再就本案訴訟為實質審查。故而，停權假處分固然提供了快速介入、制衡經營者的管道，但因為獨重擔保，也可能造成肆意濫權者藉假處分，卻驅逐堅持理想之專業經營者的反淘汰情況。 因此，祇問擔保，不論是非的結果是：第一，司法體系向富者傾斜造成不公、破壞市場機制，以及第二，業界沒有客觀的行為標準可供參考，因為法院從未對具體行為的適法性表示意見，以及第三，法院喪失定紛止爭，公正仲裁功能，而淪為奪權鬥爭工具。 |
| 英文摘要 | In general, directors may be removed by a vote of shareholders. Under the ROC Corporation Law, however, a court can also remove directors for cause in a suit by a designated percentage of shareholders. Such shareholders often petition for temporary suspension in order to mitigate damages or avoid future losses while suing for removal. In practice, though, the aforesaid measures are usually taken to change the power structures in a battle for corporate control. To prevent the abuse of power by controlling shareholders, the ROC Corporation Law provides for courts' removal of directors for fraud, gross incompetence, or dishonesty so that controlling shareholders cannot block the removal of incompetent directors. Corporate governance will not be enhanced, however, unless the following requirements are met. First, the directors are the ones hat actually possess management~ powers. Owing to the nominee device under the ROC Corporation Law, directors of Taiwanese corporations are often dummies of controlling shareholders. Therefore, even though the directors are removed by courts, the corporate power structure will remain un- changed. Secondly, the courts may only remove directors for cause, and unless the problem of information asymmetry can be solved, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an outsider-shareholder to establish such cause. Third, and lastly, under the ROC Corporation Law, an outsider-shareholder must meet certain procedural requirements be- fore he or she may sue for removal of directors. Such procedural requirements result in unnecessary' delay and provide the directors (or controlling shareholders) room for manipulation. Suits for courts' removal hence become both time-consuming and costly, an unattractive option for minority shareholders. The procedural requirements need be abolished if one wishes to improve corporate governance through courts' removal of incompetent directors. Due to the reasons mentioned above, an outsider-shareholder usually lacks both incentives and resources to file suits for courts' removal of directors. Such suits then become common practice in battle for corporate control, especially in the case of divided board. In order to expedite the process of control change, actions for removal of directors of the opposing camp are usually initiated, followed by petition for temporary suspension of such directors. As courts are inclined not to review the merits of such actions, but only require that the petitioner provide security against possible damages, the one that possesses sufficient re- sources (not good causes) will succeed in suspending the opponents' directory powers, and ultimately prevail in the power battle. This paper will explore the numerous problems involving actions for courts' removal and suspension of directors. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。