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題 名 | 臺海兩岸加入GATT/WTO的政治紛爭--從「名分秩序」論「加盟模式」的建構=Political Struggle for the Accession to the GATT/WTO on the Strait of Taiwan--An "Accession Model Construction" Perspective Analysis |
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作 者 | 張啟雄; | 書刊名 | 興大歷史學報 |
卷 期 | 15 2004.10[民93.10] |
頁 次 | 頁61-104 |
分類號 | 573.07 |
關鍵詞 | 關稅暨貿易總協定; 世界貿易組織; 聯合國; 九二年主席聲明; 三通; 一個中國; 先中後臺; 委任事項與組成; 締約方; 工作小組; 加盟模式; 名分秩序論; 中華世界秩序原理; GATT; WTO; United nations; Statement by the chairman; Three links; One China; PRC's accession before Chinese Taipei; Term of reference and composition; Working party; Contracting party; The model of accession; Status-and-Order principle; Principles of the Chinese world order; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 世界貿易組織(World Trade Organization,WTO)在世界經貿上扮演著極為重要的角色,它於1995年元月一日正式取代舊有「關稅暨貿易總協定」(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT)的地位與功能,成為獨立於聯合國之外,負責管理世界經濟貿易秩序的永久性國際經貿組織。為因應WTO成立後,世界經貿全球化日益強烈的趨勢,兩岸除積極謀求參加WTO外,並因此掀起中國代表權或主權的紛爭,致使WTO從原本單純的國際經貿組織,演變成兩岸為名分而角力的舞台。本論文透過對海峽兩岸積極參與GATT/WTO以及入會過程的研究,了解海峽兩岸對於「加盟名分」與「入會秩序」的堅持,並進而透過「名分秩序論」(「中華世界秩序原理」的次級理論)來解釋兩岸雙方舉措的深刻意涵。 從海峽兩岸加入GATT/WTO的過程,可窺探出兩岸對名分秩序的堅持,與其極度敏感性。例如:大陸不允許臺灣以中華民國(Republic of China)為申請入會的會籍名稱;其次,大陸企圖以「一個中國」原則做為讓臺灣加入WTO的條件;再者,「先中後臺」入會程序的策略,藉此入會的「先後次序」來判定「主從名分」,在在顯示兩岸對名分秩序之微妙作用的理解與重視。 觀察兩岸參與GATT/WTO的策略,就大陸立場而言,北京強調以「一個中國」原則,認為處理臺灣「入會案」的名稱問題,應以「九二共識」的一中原則為基礎,藉此突顯「臺灣是中國的附屬關稅領域」,再者,運用「先中後臺」的入會時間的先後差距,用以暗示臺灣的國際地位次於大陸,並等同於香港、澳門,甚至強調中國的主權及於臺灣。在臺灣立場而言,1990年臺灣方面依GATT第33條之規定,以「臺灣、澎湖、金門、馬祖關稅領域」(Customs Territory of TPKM)的名義正式申請入會,其目的除了表示不再與大陸爭奪中國代表權外,並可避免國際間將臺灣視為中國的一部分,因此在入會時間的策略上,堅持要求GATT/WTO依經濟發展的程度與經貿自由的開放程度讓兩岸分別加入,或讓大陸與臺灣同時入會,以突顯兩岸是兩個對等的「政治實體」,從而避免被大陸矮化成地方政府,此種種安排皆可見臺灣方面對涉及名分秩序議題的交涉,皆戒慎恐懼,極其謹慎小心。 2001年11月在卡達(Qatar)舉行第四屆WTO部長級會議,討論海峽兩岸的入會案時,雙方對名分的堅持更加鮮明、激烈。由於大陸的堅持與強力運作,WTO遂依「九二年主席聲明」讓大陸比臺灣早一天簽署入會案。中共堅持「先中後臺」的入會先後原則,卻因此需繳交世貿組織2001年會費四百萬美元的代價,並且將調適期及關稅減讓承諾提前一年,其利益損失可能超過百億人民幣。中共寧願捨龐大之經濟利益,堅持入會時間須「先中後臺」,顯示它對先後入會之名分秩序的堅持,其追求精神意義遠大於對實質經濟利益的考慮。此種割捨龐大實質經濟利益以就隱晦不明之名分秩序的舉措,實非西方式的文化價值所能理解與解釋,唯有採用「名分秩序論」來加以研究,站在這個基礎之上,本文始得以創造出兩岸間參與國際組織的「加盟模式」。 在海峽兩岸皆成為WTO的會員之際,目前正是反省、檢討雙方入會過程之得失,展望未來的時機。本研究期許不但有理論創新的學術目的,也有關懷兩岸關係的實務目的,藉由觀察雙方在入會過程互動,與入會後所堅持的「原則」,並透過「名分秩序論」之文化價值的詮釋,歸納出兩岸互動下臺灣參與國際組織的「加盟模式」,並藉此深入分析其背後的價值判斷與文化意涵,用以豐富「中華世界秩序原理」的內涵,進而嘗試用此「加盟模式」來解釋過去、預測未來雙方在全球化下參與各項國際組織的可能性,及兩岸在各層面的交流與摩擦。 |
英文摘要 | Since 1st January 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been responsible for the control of world trade order. It is a permanent international trade orgainization independent from the UN replacing the status and function of the then existing General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT). To cope with the globalization of economy and trade, the two regimes on the Taiwan Strait not only worked actively towards the accession to the WTO, but also struggled for China's representation or sovereignty. This in effect turned the WTO from a strict global trade organization into a place witnessing the tug-of-war between the two regimes over the status-and-order issue. Through researches into both regimes' active seeking of accession to the WTO and the related processes, this paper reveals that both sides on the Strait were insistent on their respective “status of accession” and “order of accession”. It is an interpretation of the profound contexts of measures taken by both regimes in the light of “status-and-order” perspective (which is part of the principle of the Chinese world order). Both regimes' sensitivities and insistence can easily be observed from the processes of their applications for admission to the WTO membership. For example both the WTO and the PRC had banned Taipei from using the title of “ROC” since Taiwan's filling of the application form. Furthermore, the mainland China tried to push “one China” principle as the criterion for Taiwan's accession to the WTO; later, the strategy of the “PRC's accession before Chinese Taipei” was used to define or distinguish prior admission under the “status-and-order” perspective. These attempts exposed the fact that both regimes did care so much about the status-and-order that they approached their respective WTO membership with great attention and subtlety. On the part of the mainland China, Beijing stressed the “one China principle” and the application of the “1992 consensus” to Taiwan's case, the aim of which was to emphasize “Taiwan as a subsidiary customs territory of the PRC”; furthermore, the time lag as found in “PRC's accession before Chinese Taipei” implies that Taiwan's international status is lower than that of mainland China, being something equal to the status of Hong Kong and Macao. The PRC even persistiently stresses that her sovereignty extends to and over Taiwan. On Taiwan's part, its formal application of 1990 was made under the name of “Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” pursuant to the GATT Article 33. By choosing such a title, Taiwan wanted to avoid the idea of its being taken as part of China by the international community. Meanwhile, Taiwan insisted that both Taiwan and the PRC should be admitted to the WTO at the same time so as to make it public that there are two “political entities” while avoiding those arrangements set by the PRC to downplay the status of Taiwan. This shows that Taiwan could not be more cautious, if not scared, in any negotiations that involved the issue of status. Both regimes insisted even more obviously and fierecely on the status-and-order issue at the fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting held in November 2001, which discussed the accession of the two sides on the Strait. Due to the PRC's insistence and strong lobby, the WTO admitted the PRC one day earlier before Taiwan according to the “1992 presidential statement”. This principle cost the PRC more than RBM ten billons, including at least US$4 millions paid to the WTO for 2001 annual fees and twenty days left for the first year of Tariff Concessions and adjustment. The PRC sacrificed huge economic interests and insisted on the “PRC's accession before Chinese Taipei.” This reveals that the PRC understands and insists on the meaning of bandwagon effect in the status-and-order issue over the accession. It is however more of spiritual consideration than a concrete economic interest as such. It is hard for westerners to understand and explain the behavior of sacrificing huge economic interests only for the underlying status-and-order perspective. We could better understand the subtlety of this cultural value only by adopting the approach of “status-and-order”. Now that both regimes had entered the WTO. It is time both to review the process of their respective accession and to look forward to the future. This research has not only an academic purpose of theoretical innovation, but also a pragmatic end of a study relating to the Strait of Taiwan. It aims to enrich the “Principle of the Chinese World Order” through exploring the value judgment and requisite cultural contexts, in an attempt to apply this “model of accession” in explaining and predicting the possibilities of both regimes in their participation of various international organizations in the face of globalization and the interaction of the two sides on the Strait of Taiwan. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。