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題名 | 真實的幻覺=Veridical Hallucination |
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作者姓名(中文) | 呂姿瑩; | 書刊名 | 哲學與文化 |
卷期 | 29:11=342 2002.11[民91.11] |
頁次 | 頁1040-1050+1061 |
分類號 | 191 |
關鍵詞 | 知覺; 直接實在論; 表徵實在論; 幻覺; 心理表徵; 因果歷程; Causal process; Direct realism; Hallucination; Mental representation; Representation realism; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 知覺經驗是提供人類知識來源的最重要基礎,而知覺的本質問題就是探討,知覺是透過怎樣的一種方式將外在世界呈現給我們。直接實論和表徵實在論提供了兩種截然相反的哲學立場。 直接實在論與表徵實在論的爭議點在於:知覺是否必定涉及心理中介?表徵實在論主張知覺必定涉及某種心理表徵作為中介,而非外在事物事接的呈現,因此,表徵實在論的主張能夠消解了幻覺問題所帶來的困難。 直接實在論主張我們能夠直接知覺外在世界,而不需透過任何非物質的中介;一旦如此,直接實在論必須以另一種方式來解釋幻覺與真實知覺。但是我將在本文中以「真實的幻覺」這個概念論證直接實在論並不可行。 |
英文摘要 | Perceptual experiences can be considered the most important foundation of human knowledge. The question “What is the nature of perception” has been one of the central issues in epistemology. Briefly, the question of perception is to investigate how perception presents the external world to us. Direct realism and representative realism are two contrary perspectives with regard to this aspect of the epistemological investigation. The main difference between direct realism and representative realism is whether perception is mediate or immediate. Representative realism insists that perception must involve some kind of mental items as mediation. There-fore, representative realism can explain the hallucination problem. In contrast, if perception can directly contact the external world without any psychological mediation, then direct realists must bring up a satisfactory explanation of why perceivers are unable to tell hallucination from veridical perception. But I will argue in terms of the idea, “veridical hallucination”, and prove that Direct Realism is wrong. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。