查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 單一選區與複數選區相對多數制下的選民策略投票=A Comparison of Voters' Strategic Voting in Single Member and Multiple Member Districts Plurality System |
---|---|
作 者 | 黃秀端; | 書刊名 | 東吳政治學報 |
卷 期 | 13 2001.09[民90.09] |
頁 次 | 頁37-75 |
分類號 | 572.3 |
關鍵詞 | 策略投票; 選舉體系; 單一選區多數代表制; 單記非讓渡投票法; 政黨抉擇; 政黨認同; 配票; Strategic voting; Electoral system; Single member district plurality system; Single non-transferable vote system; SNTV; Party choice; Party identification; Vote equalization; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 近年來國內有關選舉之研究雖然不少,但是鮮少有學者討論不同選舉 制度之差異是否影響選民之投票抉擇。我國總統、省市長及縣市長選舉採單一選 區多數投票法,立委選舉採複數選區相對多數制,本文旨在探討選民在如此不同 之選舉制度下是否有不同的策略投票行為? 本文利用立委選舉、省市長選舉以及總統選舉的調查訪問資料以及歷年來中選會 的選舉結果資料,來比較分析在單一選區以及複數選區單記投票制下,選民之投 票決定是否會有不同之策略性思考,以及家庭其他成員是否相互影響。 就整體而言,我們發現在單一選區中選民的策略投票為黨際間選票之轉移。換言 之,在單一選區中如果有三個或三個以上政黨存在時,支持實力較弱的政黨的選 民為避免選票浪費,會將選票轉給兩大黨中他較不討厭的政黨,所以選票轉移是 從一個政黨轉向另外一個政黨。 反之,複數選區的選票轉移是黨內間之轉移,即選民為了使選票不致浪費於超強 或過弱之候選人,以極大化政黨在選區內之席次,而將選票從該黨中的某一位候 選人轉移到另外一位候選人。因此我們將可能預期歷屆行政首長選舉的各政黨得 票率之波動程度遠高於複數選區之選舉。 就個人投票抉擇而言,在單一選區中,政黨認同愈強者越不可能進行策略性投 票,因為此將意味將其寶貴之一票投給他黨。相反地,在複數選區中,政黨認同 越強者,越可能進行策略性投票,因其選票之轉移是在同黨內候選人之間,其目 的是為了增加該政黨在選區內之席次。就家庭成員而言,在單一選區中,同一家 庭之成員應集中全力支持同一候選人,除非家庭中不同成員有意識形態或政黨認 同之差異。但是,在複數選區中,家庭中成員可能因為配票原故,而支持不同候 選人。 |
英文摘要 | Researches on voting behavior have rested very heavily on evidence from either the U.S. or British experiences. They both have single member district plurality system. In the United States, voters are generally making one choice between two alternatives. When the voters choose the party, they also choose the party's candidate, when the voters pick up the candidate, they also pick the party he represented. But in Taiwan, most legislator elections are based on multiple member districts, voters only have a single vote, regardless of the district magnitude, and votes are not transferable to other candidates of the same party. In order to maximize their seats in the district, parties usually nominate more than one candidate in a district, thus, candidates from the same party will compete with each other. Since the votes are not transferable, it is dangerous if one candidate is so popular that captures most of the votes for his party, while other candidates of his party in the district will not get elected. How to distribute the votes among its candidates in order to win as many seats as possible becomes a major task for the parties in the system. For the voters, facing so many candidates from the same party, party identification may not be enough for them to vote, they need other cues. Moreover, in order to see their party gain maximum seats, voters many vote strategically. The results of this paper indicate that electoral system do make voters choices differently. In a single member district plurality system, strategic voters cast their votes from one weak party to the other strong party, it is inter-party transference. On the other hand, in multiple member district, in order to maximize their seats in the district, people transfer their votes from one candidate to another candidate among the candidates of the same party, so it is intra-party transference. Moreover, from the survey research data, we also find that in a single member district, the stronger the party identification, the less they will do the strategic vote; on the contrary, in multiple member district, the stronger the party identification, the more they will do strategic voting. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。