查詢結果分析
相關文獻
- 十八世紀滇銅市場中的官商關係與利益觀念
- 保守主義和中國現代化過程中的政經轉型
- 國家障礙--中國大陸國有企業改革的分析視角
- 訊息不足對決策行為之影響--賽局、訊息與交易成本三理論之觀點
- 社會主義市場經濟對中國大陸學校體育之影響
- 評哈貝馬斯的《後民族的格局》
- 中共實施「依法治國」方略初探--兼論在市場經濟下的民主與法制問題
- 中國特色的社會主義市場經濟：論改革開放下的經濟建構
- 消費者結構、交易成本、與商圈組織型態--臺北市公館、頂好商圈的調查分析
- Global Liberalization and Domestic Accommodation: The Case of the Chinese Socialist Market Economy
頁籤選單縮合
| 題 名 | 十八世紀滇銅市場中的官商關係與利益觀念="Interests" in Economic Organization: The Shaping of the Yunnan Copper Market in Eighteenth-century China |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 邱澎生; | 書刊名 | 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊 |
| 卷 期 | 72:1 2001.03[民90.03] |
| 頁 次 | 頁49-119 |
| 分類號 | 561.892 |
| 關鍵詞 | 滇銅; 交易成本; 利益觀念; 市場經濟; 明清中國; Yunnan copper; Transaction cost; Understandings of interest; Economic development; Late imperial China; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 透過雲南銅礦的生產與流通，本文嘗試檢討明清中國市場經濟的性質。十六世紀以後，明清長程貿易與區域經濟分工都有進一步發展，隨著晚明以來政府對鑄幣銅材需求的鉅額增長，滇銅在十八世紀成為中國最主要的鑄幣銅材來源。從乾隆五年到嘉慶十五年 (1740-1810) 的七十年間，滇銅每年維持至少一千萬斤的產量，構成當時長程貿易與全國市場的重要一環。分析滇銅產銷過程中的官商關係與利益觀念，可以深入理解十八世紀中國市場經濟的重要特徵。 分析十八世紀滇銅市場的發展過程，要同時注意官商關係與利益觀念兩方面的變化。官商關係的變化主要包含二項：一是商人資本與政府資本大量流入銅廠，改變了礦廠組織形態，使辦礦資本與開礦風險都急速增加；二是藉助「官本收銅、官銅店、運官運銅、銅廠七長」等銅政制度的改良，政府發揮更重要的經濟功能，無論是在調節滇銅市價波動、協調礦坑產權糾紛以及有效使用運輸工具等方面，政府其實都在意圖之外地提供種種足以降低交易成本的市場規範。利益觀念的變化則至少包含「發財」與「公利之利」兩項。隨著銅廠規模擴大，某些銅廠商人形成一種特殊的「發財」觀念。當時雲南銅廠是種高風險但卻不一定高獲利的行業，然而，商人卻不惜盡耗財產投資銅廠，甚至產生追求成堂大礦的一種極度渴望，那已不是單純成本、利潤考量所能說明，既包括了成功出礦獲得大眾肯定的個人成就感，也帶著一種克服開礦風險的刺激心理，不同於一般商人的「發財」觀念。隨著礦業政策與銅政制度的改革，十八世紀初年有官員正式提出「公利之利」的觀念，並具體影響到銅政制度的改革，連帶推進了政府支持甚至借貸商人開礦的正當性。 在十八世紀滇銅流通過程中，不僅發生政府貸款給商人、協助形成市場規範等等新形態的官商關係，「發財」以及「公利之利」等利益觀念也得到更多調整與結合，降低了社會對商人追求「私利」現象的疑慮、衝突與對抗。官商關係與利益觀念的變化，具體反映在十八世紀滇銅流通過程中，成為當時中國市場經濟的重要特色。 |
| 英文摘要 | By focusing on the production and circulation of Yunnan copper in the eighteenth century, this article investigates the important facets of economic development in Late Imperial China. The growth of long-distance trade in China is tremendous from the sixteenth to eighteenth century, as some new research have proved. "Traditional" Chinese trade expansion do not necessarily lead to "modern" economic development; for example, some scholars diagnose its nature as extensive but not intensive growth. What does "traditional" Chinese trade expansion experience really mean? I will scrutinize two aspects of this experience: 1.) the relation of government and market, 2.) the changes in the understanding of "interest". To supplement the acute scantiness of copper cash, Ming government tried to procure copper after the sixteenth century. This then became one of the critical policies in Late Imperial China. The Qing government continued and reinforced this copper procuring policy, by buying, importing, and/or mining, because the dearth of copper cash became a perennial economic and social problem. The copper of Yunnan, one of China's southwestern province, replaced the imported Japanese copper in the seventeen forties, counting for as much as 1,000 to 1,400 catties from 1740 to 1810 A.D. Outsider merchants, mostly Han and Chinese Muslim, explored many copper mines in Yunnan. In the wake of prompt accumulation of Yunnan copper, not only was the scale of Chinese national long-distance trade enlarged, but the government's economic role and understanding of "interest" also changed meaningfully. Yunnan copper mines were primarily managed by private merchants and dug by free labor in Qing period. This firm-like nature did not change; some merchant owners even accepted loans from local and central government in the eighteenth century. With the input of large private and official capital, the mining organization in big copper mines was transformed, whether in the method of exploring mineral vein, arranging labor force in shifts, equipping sufficient drains and smelting copper ore more productively. To meet all these needs, considerable capital investment had made copper mining a high-risk but not high-profit enterprise. Official loan offered merchants a relatively low interest rate capital, and sustained many copper mines. Besides loaning merchants, local government did much to ensure the ordering of copper, such as providing entrepot as a wholesale marketplace, assisting contract making of limited transport means around the mining mountain, and protecting property rights during mining negotiations among merchants. Unintentionally those official governances reduced the transaction costs of copper exchange and made the copper market more efficient. The relation of government and market had changed obviously in the formation of the eighteenth century Yunnan copper long-distance trade. The understandings of "interest" had also changed significantly, both in merchant mentality behind mining investment activity and in economic argumentation during mining policy debate. Some merchants invested almost all their money to the Yunnan copper industry, in danger of going bankrupt. The copper merchant mentality, recorded in the local description of the mid-nineteenth century, was composed of rational choice in cost-profit analysis, sentiments of great fulfillment, and excitement in overcoming huge uncertainty in risky mine exploration. Thus it has forged a particular self-interest understanding in merchant's investment activity. When procuring copper in Yunnan and other provinces had acquired its importance in the eighteenth century Qing economic policy, some officials has proposed a new criteria for discerning the general "interest" from private "interest" during the mining policy debating. This new criteria of general "interest" constituted those officials' main economic policy argumentation. By legitimizing private mining manufacture policy with the new general "interest", not only did copper merchants get their official loans more easily, but also merchants and officials in copper mining management became more gratified. Besides the sense of gratification, merchants also amassed their fortunes, and the officials in charge gained promotions. The growth of long-distance trade in the eighteenth China is an economic process with political and cognitive recombination. In political field, the Qing governances in Yunnan copper mines unintentionally reduced the transaction costs of copper exchange; in cognitive field, I mean that the understandings of "interest" changed both in merchant mentality and economic policy argumentation. With all these changes made the eighteenth century Yunnan copper market work more efficiently. In locating the government's economic role in Late Imperial China, there are two opposite prevailing imaginations: one prefers "despotism" in all fields, including predatory state economic policy; the other favors "feudalism", emphasizing incompetent state economic performance. The Yunnan copper case asserts that both these pictures are painted with far too broad a brush, though in different colors. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。