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題 名 | Stackelberg賽局與Nash賽局之公共財生產均衡--論最弱環法則與最強棒法則=The Equilibrium of Stackelberg and Nash under Alternative Public Goods Composition |
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作 者 | 許義忠; | 書刊名 | 淡江人文社會學刊 |
卷 期 | 4 1999.11[民88.11] |
頁 次 | 頁91-107 |
分類號 | 564.6 |
關鍵詞 | 公共財; 最弱環法則; 最強棒法則; Nash均衡; Stackelberg均衡; Stackelberg game; Nash game; Weakest-Link; Best-Shot; Public goods; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文藉由不同生產方式之公共財,突顯出Varian(1994)的結果不具備頑強性。 Varian(1994)假設公共財的投入可加總,且消費者效用函數為準線性的情況下,比較了Nash 均衡及Stackelberg均衡下的結果。他發現Nash均衡下公共財的水準必高於Stackelberg 均衡下的水準。本文係對於Varian(1994)文中的公共財生產方式作了修正。假設公共財的 生產方式是依所有人投入的最小值(稱最弱環法則)決定,則Stackelberg均衡所獲得之水準 必不低於Nash均衡;另外,當公共財的生產方式是依所有人投入的最大值(稱最強棒法則)決 定時,則Nash均衡不一定會高於Stackelberg均衝。故當公共財生產方式改變後,Varian 的結論須作大幅修正。 |
英文摘要 | This paper shows that the results of Varian (1994) are not robust when considering alternative public good composition. In his paper, which assumes the public-good composition rule is additive and all consumers have quasilinear utility function, Varian compares the Nash equilibrium with the Stackelberg equilibrium. His main finding is that the total amount of the public good provided in a Stackelberg game is never larger than the amount provided in a Nash game. I examine Varian's results in alternative public good compositions of Weakest-Link and Best-Shot. In the Weakest-Link case, the Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes are not less than the Nash equilibrium outcomes. In the Best-Shot case, the Nash equilibrium outcomes are not always higher than that of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Therefore, when the public good composition is not additive, Varian's conclusion does not hold and needs to be revised. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。