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題名 | 維根斯坦可說和不可說觀之演變=On the Evolution of Wittgenstein's View on the Distinction between What Can be Said and What Cannot be Said |
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作者 | 韓林合; | 書刊名 | 哲學與文化 |
卷期 | 27:10=317 2000.10[民89.10] |
頁次 | 頁945-970+997-998 |
分類號 | 147.79 |
關鍵詞 | 事實世界; 神秘之域; 語言的界限; 顯示; 形而上學主體; 經驗主體; The factual world; The mystical realm; The limits of language; Show; The metaphysical subject; The empirical subject; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文比較系統地考察了維根斯坦之可說和不可說思想的演變歷程。作者認為,維根斯坦的思想發展實際上可以分為三個階段:前期──二十年代末以前;中期:──三十年代初期;後期──三十年代中期以後。前期維根斯坦以其對語言和世界的邏輯結構的分析為基礎,認為只有現實世界中的事實和可能世界 中的事態才是可以言說的,而處於它們之外的神秘之域是不可言說的。而且不止於此,語言和世界所共同具有的邏輯性質、由這些性質所決定的共同於命題和事實或事態的邏輯形式以及命題的意義也是不可言說的。二十年代末以後,維根斯坦雖然己經認識到他以前關於語言和世界的邏輯結構分析是存在著一些問題的,但認為它從總體上說仍然是可以接受的,因而仍然堅持著他以前作出的可說和不可說的嚴格區分,特別是他進一步發展了他以前關於神秘之域的觀點。但是三十年代中期以後,維根斯坦認識到,他以前關於語言和世界的邏輯結構的分析不僅從局部上說是錯誤的,而且從總體上說就是不可接受的。正因如此,他徹底 拋棄了他以前關於可說和不可說的嚴格區分,特別是他取消了他以前作出的現實世界或可能世界和神秘之域的嚴格區分。 |
英文摘要 | In hits paper, the author traces the development of Wittgenstein’s thought on what can be said and what cannot be said. It is printed out that Wittgenstein’s thought on this thesis presents itself in three stages: the early period-before the late 1920s, the middle period-the early 1930s, and the late period-after the middle 1930s. The author argues that Wittgenstein, on the basis of his analysis of the structure of language and the world, insists that only the facts in the actual world and the possible situation in the possible world and the possible situations in the possible worlds can be said and that the mystical realm beyond the actual world and the possible worlds cannot be said. Furthermore the logical properties that language and the world have in common, the propositions determined by these common properties, the logical forms of facts and possible situations, and the meaning of these propositions, all these can not be said either. In the middle period, Wittgenstein recognizes the errors he made with parts of his early analysis about the structure of language and the world, but the still claims that this analysis is generally acceptable. Therefore, he still upholds his early argument about what can be said and what can not be said; he further develops his view on the so-called mystical realm. In the late period, Wittgenstein comes to realize that his early view on the structure of language and the world is totally wrong. As a result, he not only denies the distinction between what can be said and what cannot be said, but also rejects the distinction between the world (and the possible worlds) and he mystical realm. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。