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題 名 | 大學校園研究室的分配問題與拍賣=Office Assignment Problems in Academia and Auctions |
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作 者 | 衛忠欣; 許翠珍; 黃秀蓉; | 書刊名 | 公平交易季刊 |
卷 期 | 7:3 1999.07[民88.07] |
頁 次 | 頁99-111 |
分類號 | 551.8 |
關鍵詞 | 資源分配機制; 拍賣設計; 維克瑞拍賣; 學術圈; Allocation mechanism; Auction design; Vickrey auction; Academia; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 在大學校園這一 (經濟) 社會裡,經濟學者可曾想過要以市場分配攝制來解決資源分配 (如一棟新大樓中,教授研究室的重分配) 問題?美國亞利桑那州立大學經濟系的一次創意性的拍賣,在1989年被發表成論文。我們先將該論文中譯,輔以兩篇附錄,介紹拍賣的經濟分析給 (不屬專門領域的) 讀者,以及我們在逢甲大學拍賣研究生座位的真實故事。盼能拋磚引玉,提振產官學界對拍賣這一「分配機制」之持續性、多方位的研究興趣。 |
英文摘要 | Will academic economists ever consider applying the market mechanism to their real-life allocation problems such as reassigning faculty offices in a new building on campus? An innovating auction held in the Economics Department at Arizona State University was documented in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (1989, vo1.3, no.3, pp.37-40). We provide, with copyright permission granted by the American Economic Association, a Chinese translation and supplement it by two appendices. The first appendix gives an introductory accounts of Vickrey auctions and pin-points why such games are of great interest to economists; the second reports a similar but extended experiment taking place at Feng Chia University where the priority of choosing desk was auctioned (a la Vickrey)sequentially among first-year graduate students. Our hope is to generate research interest (along this line but with depth and scope strengthened)among the entrepreneurs, the bureaucrats, and the academics. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。